Posts tagged ‘Kibaki’

July 6, 2010

Kenya: From Conservative Oligarchy to Liberal Dictatorship

An Erosion of Rights  from Free speech to SIM cards.

The government wants to get into your bedsheets with you. They want to see what you wear when you go to bed, who or what you get into bed with, and why. They want to listen in as you whisper those sweet nothings to whomever or whatever it is that keeps you company. They want to be so far into your business, they will be able to hear you think. Better believe it.While Kenya is gripped with referendum fever over the proposed constitution, the government has declared that compulsory registration of mobile phone Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) cards has begun, and will continue for another month or so. The ostensible reason is that this will help government fight crimes such as mobile phone theft, kidnappings, and the like. This is nonsense.

A traceable SIM card in a stolen phone can simply be thrown away. Similarly, it is ludicrous for the government to think kidnappings will cease merely because text messages can be traced to a given cellphone number. What’s to stop the kidnappers using one of the many free web-based services to send the text message? They could even use the kidnapped person’s own cellphone to send text messages or make calls – what’s to stop them?No, this is not about crime and security. This is about government wanting to listen in, to spy on us, to take us back to the bad old days under the malevolent regime of President Moi, when you could not say anything without a furtive look over your shoulder. It is a massive step back in civil liberties.

Unfortunately, our representatives in Parliament seem to be too busy holding night-and-day referendum meetings to take note of what is happening. It also flies in the face of economic sense. The mobile phone sector in Kenya – and most of Africa – is booming essentially because there is little or no bureaucracy involved in purchasing a mobile phone SIM card.Replacing a lost one is easy, but most people do not bother to go through the hassle of lining up at their service provider’s to wait for this: they simply purchase a new line and advise their contacts to change to the new number. This is what has kept the dynamic mobile phone sector so vibrant and profitable.

The introduction of mobile phone registration will very quickly curtail growth in the sector, as many people will be reluctant to provide their details to the government, knowing that this government has, in the past, actively sought to block citizens from even sending each text messages – as happened during the disputed general elections of 2007.It is virtually guaranteed that a significant proportion of subscribers will let their SIM cards lapse. Corruption will enter the mobile phone sector, as proxy registrations gain ground: indeed, unscrupulous agents with fake identity cards will pop up to help customers register SIM cards falsely. The directive will hit service providers’ bottom lines quite significantly: the massive sales they have witnessed through decentralised, roadside shops will simply stop.

That is not to say there is no place for some form of registration – there is, as the popular M-Pesa money transfer service has shown. However, such registration should be service-related and voluntary, rather than a Big-Brother-style gun-on-your-temple quid pro quo for accessing telephony and similar communication service.Considering that criminal messages can also be passed using email, shall we see the government seek to have people register their computers and email addresses with the CCK? After all, one might want to trace the source of an email if such a facility is used in committing crime. Perhaps we should also have identifiable cyber-café accounts, too.

This SIM card registration directive is wrong and should be re-thought. It is perhaps no coincidence that many of the countries that have implemented such schemes – like Iran, Ethiopia and the like – are among the most oppressive in the world. In the hands of Kenyan security and intelligence forces, SIM card registration will simply become yet another tool of repression and denial of civil rights.

By P. Wanyonyi – published NMDN

April 10, 2010

Economist :Will justice be done at last?

Apr 8th 2010 | | From The Economist print edition

So far nobody has been charged with killing any of the 1,100-plus Kenyans who died in the violence after a disputed election at the end of 2007. The Kenyans were meant to set up their own tribunals to punish the worst offenders. But since they failed to do so, the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague has at last agreed to proceed with cases against unnamed powerful Kenyans who, for their own political ends, are suspected of inciting the violence and paying its perpetrators.

The court’s decision has been eagerly awaited for two years. It has been strongly endorsed by Kofi Annan, a former secretary-general of the UN, who helped bring peace after the election by persuading the president, Mwai Kibaki, and the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, to form a unity government. Mr Kibaki, a Kikuyu, stayed on as president, with his pals keeping a grip on finance and security. Mr Odinga, a Luo who claims kinship with Barack Obama, became prime minister, with people in his wider and looser alliance getting a raft of lesser ministries. The bloated coalition’s first task was to set up a special tribunal to charge those responsible for the election violence. But nothing happened. Cases against several thousand people accused of such crimes as arson, rioting, looting and shooting were opened. Thanks to police bungling few have ever come to court.

All the more important, then, to hold the higher-ups to account. The ICC is keen. Its chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, an Argentine, says the Kenyan case is among the most clear-cut in his docket. Plentiful evidence was gathered at the time by human-rights workers, journalists, security men and diplomats. There is no shortage of witnesses, though the ICC wants a witness-protection programme put in place. Most Kenyans seem to trust the court. Messrs Kibaki and Odinga sound co-operative. Mr Odinga says he will send anybody the ICC asks for to The Hague. Mr Kibaki says he agrees. The justice minister insists his ministry is ready to help. Mr Moreno-Campo says his team will start work in Kenya in May. Verdicts, he reckons, could be handed down in 2012.

But there are snags galore. For a start, the ICC’s timetable means the trials would take place amid Kenya’s next elections, when the risk of violence is highest. A trial just then might well be portrayed as a show-trial. Then there is the tricky question of whom the ICC would pick to send to The Hague. Mr Moreno-Ocampo has hinted there will be only a handful of prosecutions, perhaps a couple from each side of the ruling coalition. A senior politician from the Kalenjin group might, say, be charged with responsibility for killing Kikuyu women and children in the Rift Valley, while a senior Kikuyu could be accused of paying off Kikuyu gangs to kill opposition backers in Nairobi. Most Kenyans seem to want bigwigs put in the dock, in the hope of ending impunity for top people that has so damaged the country.

It will be hard to nail them down. The rich have expensive lawyers. Mr Kibaki may find excuses for refusing to give up one of his allies. Mr Moreno-Ocampo, for his part, must display the balancing skills of a trapeze artist. If he is thought to favour one side or another, violence could erupt. If the ICC seems to wield too heavy a stick, the accused may stir up anti-colonial feeling—still a potent force—in their defence. Above all, the ICC must navigate the murky waters of Kenyan politics, where alliances can change with unexpected speed. For example, the minister of agriculture, William Ruto, a Kalenjin, has reached out to a once-implacable rival, Uhuru Kenyatta, the minister of finance, a Kikuyu who is a son of Kenya’s founding president and who, by some estimates, is Mr Kibaki’s chosen successor.

March 18, 2010

Seasons & Generational Change.

The Agĩkũyũ had four seasons and two harvests in one year.1. Mbura ya njahĩ [The Season of Big Rain] from March to July,2. Magetha ma njahĩ [The season of the big harvest] between July and Early October ,3. Mbura ya Mwere [Short rain season] from October to January,4. Magetha ma Mwere [the season of harvesting millet]

Further, time was recorded through the initiation. Each initiation group was given special name. According to *Professor Godfrey Mũriũki, The individual initiation sets are then grouped into a regiment every nine calendar years. Before a regiment or army set, there was a period in which no initiation of boys took place. This period lasted a total of four and a half calendar years [nine seasons in Gĩkũyũ land, each season referred to as imera] and is referred to as mũhingo, initiation taking place at the start of the fifth year and going on annually for the next nine calendar years. This was the system adopted in Metumi [Mũrang’a]. The regiment or army sets also get special names, some of which seem to have ended up as popular male names.

In Gaki [Nyeri] the system was inversed with initiation taking place annually for four calendar years, which would be followed by a period of nine calendar years in which no initiation of boys took place [mũhingo]. Girls on the other hand were initiated every year. Several regiments then make up a ruling generation.

It was estimated that Ruling generation last an average of 35 years. The names of the initiation and regiment sets vary within Gĩkũyũ land. The ruling generations are however uniform and provide very important chronological data. On top of that, the initiation sets were a way of documenting events within the Gĩkũyũ nation, so, for example, were the occurrence of small pox and syphilis recorded. Girls’ initiation sets were also accorded special names, although there has been little research in this area. Mũriũki only unearths three sets, whose names are, Rũharo [1894], Kibiri/ Ndũrĩrĩ [1895], Kagica [1896], Ndutu/ Nuthi [1897].

All these names are taken from Metumi [Mũrang’a] and Kabete [Kĩambu]. It is strange that professor Mũriũki didn’t do more research in this area because he states that the girls’ initiation took place annually.

Kikuyu Woman with Traditional symbols of power -Muthigi (stick)signifying power to lead and Itimu (Spear)-power to call people to war*Before the overthrow of Wangu wa Makeri women could carry both,

The ruling generations [riika] according to Mũriũki, which he used to trace the history of the Agĩkũyũ to the year 1500 or there abouts.

1. Manjiri 1512 – 46 ± 55

2. Mamba 1547 – 81 ± 50

3. Tene 1582 – 1616 ± 45

4. Agu 1617 – 51 ± 40

5. Manduti 1652 – 86 ± 40

6. Cuma 1687 – 1721 ± 30

7. Ciira 1722 – 56 ± 25

8. Mathathi 1757 – 1791 ± 20

9. Ndemi 1792 – 1826 ± 15

10. Iregi 1827 – 1861 ± 10

11. Maina 1862 – 97 ± 5

12. Mwangi 1898?

Mathew Njoroge Kabetũs list reads,

Tene, Kĩyĩ, Aagu, Ciĩra, Mathathi, Ndemi, Iregi, Maina [Ngotho], Mwangi

Gakaara wa Wanjaũs list reads

Tene, Nemathĩ, Kariraũ, Aagu, Tiru, Cuma, Ciira, Ndemi, Mathathi, Iregi, Maina, Mwangi, Irũngũ, Mwangi wa Mandũti. The last two generations came after 1900.

One of the earliest recorded lists by Mc Gregor reads (list taken from a history of unchanged)

Manjiri, Mandoti, Chiera, Masai, Mathathi, Ndemi, Iregi, Maina, Mwangi, Muirungu. According to Hobley(a historian) each initiation generation, riika, extended over two years. The ruling generation at the arrival of the Europeans was called Maina. It is said that Maina handed over to Mwangi in 1898. Hobley asserts that the following sets were grouped under Maina – Kĩnũthia, Karanja, Njũgũna, Kĩnyanjui, Gathuru and Ng’ang’a. Professor Mũriũki however puts these sets much earlier, namely Karanja and Kĩnũthia belong to the Ciira ruling generation which ruled from the year 1722 to 1756, give or take 25 years according to Mũriũki. Njũgũna, Kĩnyanjui, Ng’ang’a belong to the Mathathi ruling generation that ruled from 1757 to 1791 give or take 20 years according to Mũriũki.

Professors Mũriũkis list must be given precedence in this area as he conducted extensive research in this area starting 1969, and had the benefit of all earlier literature on the subject as well as doing extensive field work in the areas of Gaki [Nyeri], Metumi [Mũrang’a] and Kabete [Kĩambu]. On top of the ruling generations, he also gives names of the regiments or army sets from 1659 [within a margin of error] and the names of annual initiation sets beginning 1864. The list from Metumi [Mũrang’a] is most complete and differentiated.

Mũriũkis is also the most systematically defined list, so far. Suffice to say that most of the most popular male names in Gĩkũyũ land were names of riikas [initiation sets].

Here is Mũriũkis list of the names of regiment sets in Metumi [Mũrang’a].

These include Kiariĩ [1665 - 1673], Cege [1678 - 1678], Kamau [1704 - 1712], Kĩmani [1717 - 1725], Karanja [1730 - 1738], Kĩnũthia [1743 - 1751], Njũgũna [1756 - 1764], Kĩnyanjui [1769 - 1777] , Ng’ang’a [1781 - 1789], Njoroge [1794 - 1802], Wainaina [1807 - 1815], Kang’ethe [1820 - 1828] Mbugua [1859 – 1867], Njenga or Mbira Itimu [872 – 80], Mutung’u or Mburu [1885 – 1893]

H.E. Lambert who dealt with the riikas extensively has the following list of regiment sets from Gichũgũ and Ndia. It should be remembered that this names were unlike ruling generations not uniform in Gĩkũyũ land. It should also be noted that Ndia and Gachũgũ followed a system where initiation took place every annually for four years and then a period of nine calendar years followed where no initiation of boys took place. This period was referred to as mũhingo.

Karanja [1759 - 1762], Kĩnũthia [1772 - 1775], Ndũrĩrĩ [1785 - 1788], Mũgacho [1798 - 1801] , Njoroge [1811 - 1814], Kang’ethe [1824 - 1827], Gitaũ [ 1837 - 1840], Manyaki [1850 - 1853], Kiambuthi [1863 - 1866], Watuke [1876 - 1879], Ngũgĩ [1889 - 1892], Wakanene [1902 - 1905]

The remarkable thing in this list in comparison to the Metumi one is how some of the same names are used, if a bit off set. Ndia and Gachũgũ are extremely far from Metumi. Gaki on he other hand, as far as my geographical understanding of Gĩkũyũ land is concerned should be much closer to Metumi, yet virtually no names of regiment sets are shared. It should however be noted that Gaki had a strong connection to the Maasai living nearby.

The ruling generation names of Maina and Mwangi are also very popular male Gĩkũyũ names. The theory is also that Waciira is also derived from ciira [case], which is also a very popular name among male Agĩkũyũ. This would call into question, when it was exactly that children started being named after the parents of one parents. Had that system, of naming ones kids after ones parents been there from the beginning, there would be very few male names in circulation. This is however not the case, as there are very many Gĩkũyũ male names. My theory is though that the female names are much less, with the names of the full-nine daughters of Mũmbi being most prevalent.

Gakaara wa Wanjaũ supports this view when he writes in his book, Mĩhĩrĩga ya Aagĩkũyũ page 29.

“Hingo ĩyo ciana cia arũme ciatuagwo marĩĩtwa ma mariika ta Watene, Cuma, Iregi kana Ciira. Nao airĩĩtu magatuuo marĩĩtwa ma mĩhĩrĩga tauria hagwetetwo nah au kabere, o nginya hingo iria maundu maatabariirwo thuuthaini ati ciana ituagwo aciari a mwanake na a muirĩĩtu.”

Freely translated it means“In those days the male children were given the names of the riika [initiation set] like Watene, Cuma, Iregi or Ciira. Girls were on the other hand named after the clans that were named earlier until such a time as it was decided to name the children after the parents of the man and the woman.”From this statement it is not clear whether the girls were named ad-hoc after any clan, no matter what clan the parents belonged to. Naming them after the specific clan that the parents belonged to would have severely restricted naming options.

This would strangely mean that the female names are the oldest in Gĩkũyũ land, further confirming its matrilineal descent. As far as male names are concerned, there is of course the chicken and the egg question, of when a name specifically appeared but some names are tied to events that happened during the initiation. For example Wainaina refers to those who shivered during circumcision. Kũinaina [to shake or to shiver].

There was a very important ceremony known as Ituĩka in which the old guard would hand over the reigns of government to the next generation. This was to avoid dictatorship. Kenyatta relates of how once in the land of the Agĩkũyũ, there ruled a despotic King called Gĩkũyũ, grandson of the elder daughter [Wanjirũ according to Leakey] of the original Gĩkũyũ of Gĩkũyũ and Mũmbi fame. After he was deposed of, it was decided that the government should be democratic, which is how the Ituĩka came to be. This legend of course calls into question when it was exactly that the matrilineal rule set in. The last Ituĩka ceremony where the riika of Maina handed over power to the Mwangi generation, took place in 1898-9 [Hobley]. The next one was supposed to be held in 1925 – 1928 [Kenyatta] but was thwarted by the colonial imperialist government. And one by one Gĩkũyũ institutions crumbled

*Muriuki, Godfrey 1974. History of the Kikuyu 1500 – 1900. (Oxford U Press)

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September 3, 2009

Response to Deceptive Moralist Defence By Kikuyus 4 Change of Kalenjin Community

By Daniel Weru In response to Kalenjin Bashing-This Emerging Trend Must Be Stopped

Kikuyus for Change have just released a statement. They believe that ethnic stereotypes are harmful.

Having experienced the harm resulting from ethnic stereotypes, they’re, understandably, determined to speak out against misrepresentations of other communities as a whole. In their view, there has been serious misrepresentation of Kalenjin as a community — it’s unclear just what this amounts to, but it seems to be a variation on collective responsibility. If Kikuyus for Change are right, it is widely believed that Kalenjin are perpetrators of (significant portions) the PEV; that they are destroying the Mau; and that they are the source of discontent on coalition governance issues. Against this unfortunate state of affairs, Kikuyus for Change argue that Kalenjin are not as a community perpetrators of PEV; and that they are not as a community Mau forest occupiers. We are given exactly one reason for that: those actions – the PEV; the entrance, destruction of and refusal to leave the Mau – are not the responsibility of Kalenjin because they are the actions of individuals.

This is the sort of empty and deceptive moralism that gives advocacy organisations in Kenya a bad name.

First, though, a word about the argument. The structure should be familiar: members of a group have done some terrible things; the group is then accused of collective responsibility for those acts; it is argued, felt, or feared that the members of the accused group will be victims of bigotry. A defender of the group has three options: accept collective responsibility; deny collective responsibility; or deny that collective responsibility has anything to do with it. If he accepts collective responsibility, then the defender has to show that this group doesn’t bear collective responsibility for this act: maybe they didn’t do it, or they knew not what they did, or whatever. If he doesn’t accept collective responsibility, then it makes no odds what the group did: even if the group performed the act, it can’t be held responsible. Alternatively, the defender of the group could simply say that even if the group were collectively responsible, that wouldn’t justify bigotry against it, because ethnic bigotry is just wrong.

Kikuyus for Change supply a desperately inept version of the first, when they should have gone for the third; their moralism lies in telling untruths for (what they suppose to be) good ends. Remember that they said that the actions for which Kalenjin are held communally liable are the actions of individuals. It is clear, I think, that they aren’t denying collective responsibility; rather, their point is that even if there is collective responsibility, it doesn’t apply in this case: Kalenjin aren’t collectively responsible for, say, the PEV. The problem with that move is simple: that the actions were committed by individuals does nothing whatever to show that there’s no communal liability for them. That follows from a very simple fact: groups acts through individuals, so it is entirely possible for a communal act to be performed by an individual. Think about the President’s assent to a bill. It is an act performed by the individual who happens to hold the office at the time; it is also an act by which the state, and therefore the groups of people who constitute the state, promise to obey a certain rule. Think also about a murder, carried out by a group of three men, who jointly plan and bring it off. Roughly speaking, it’s enough, for there to be collective moral responsibility, for a group to deliberately perform an act. The group of murderers is constituted of individuals; it is their actions which constitute the planning and commission of the murder. What makes them jointly responsible is their joint deliberate participation in the joint enterprise. But that joint deliberate participation is composed of individual acts. So the fact that the actions were performed by individuals is entirely consistent with collective responsibility for them; merely noting that the actions in question are the actions of individuals is a hopeless defence to the charge of collective responsibility.

More to the point, it deliberately overlooks facts which are common knowlege. The PEV in the Rift Valley was carefully-planned, and there was wide communal involvement. (See, for example, the Human Rights Watch report). All sorts of independent evidence suggests that the violence had the consent of a significant proportion of Kalenjin; and the consent, planning and participation of those properly empowered to act in the name of the community (Ashforth, Lynch, Waki). There is pretty good evidence of wide, if not quite universal, Kalenjin approval of the consequences of the violence (Ashforth, Lynch). And, again, there have been well-reported efforts to institutionalise the consequences of the violence: segregated schools, for example. In the example I gave earlier, the consent and particpation of all the members of the group was taken to be sufficient for collective responsibility. So it might be argued that the lack of either rules out collective responsibility in this case. That’s too quick. Collective responsibility can accrue to a group for an action even when not all its members approve or participate. The clearest example is war. It’s often taken to be the case that a duly-elected head of a state or a nation has the power to commit the state or nation to a war, with the collective consequences that that brings. It’s also true that a President, say, need not be elected by the entire nation to gain that power — all that’s necessary is a majority of the vote. Donald Kipkorir’s devotion marks the extent to which the Kalenjin political class is the duly-empowered representative of the Kalenjin nation, It is tolerably clear that the Kalenjin political class arranged the relevant bits of the post-election violence, tolerably clear that they were acting in their capacity as leaders of the Kalenjin nation in doing so, and tolerably clear that there is near-unanimous Kalenjin support for the consequences (if not, perhaps, the means) of PEV. That is why it ought to be conceded that Kalenjin bear collective responsibility for it.

It’s essential at this point to distinguish kinds of collective responsibility. I have in mind the following distinction: there is a kind of collective responsibility in which each member of the community is liable (and may therefore be punished) for the actions of the entire group; and there’s the kind of collective responsibility which does not distribute in this way — where we should say that the community is responsible for the acts, but in which it doesn’t follow that each member of the community can therefore be punished for the communal act. The clearest example of the first is the first example above, the joint-murder case, in which all the deliberately participants agree to kill. The Kalenjin-communal case is of the latter kind, mostly, I think, because while there was a piece of deliberate group activity, it is also clear that this was not unanimous. To recognise collective Kalenjin responsibility is not to call for communal punishment of Kalenjin.

But suppose you don’t agree. You think that there’s no Kalenjin communal responsibility for the PEV. You should still think that the Kikuyus for Change argument is foolish. Think about like this: rape is bad, regardless of the identity of the intended victim. The prohibition against rape isn’t contingent on whether or not the intended victim is, say, a rapist: even rapists ought not to be raped. If you’re looking for reasons not to rape someone, and the best you can come up with is that they’re not a rapist, you need to buy a new moral compass.

The Kikuyus for Change argument against anti-Kalenjin bigotry is of exactly this type: instead of saying the simple and true thing — that ethnic bigotry is bad, independent of the identity of its victims — they say the complex and false thing — that anti-Kalenjin ethnic bigotry is bad because Kalenjin aren’t communally responsible for PEV. They seem unable to see the point that anti-Kalenjin bigotry is bad because it is wrong, not because Kalenjin are right.

August 15, 2009

Jimmy Kibaki

………..” Simama Kenya “

July 30, 2009

The Trail of the Serpent

Eastern Province

IDPs hounded out of resettlement Land in Ukambani “Mungiki wa rudi kwao” was the chant by one of the women  .

Rift Valley Province

Kamwaura, Kenya – “They’ve pulled up my crops again,” said Jane Wangui, a Kikuyu who still lives in a camp for fear of returning to the farm near ethnic Kalenjin she fled last year. “I can no longer trust them.”Her feet blackened by the soil, Jane, 60, rests after a morning on her “shamba” (farm), a 90-minute walk from the “transit” camp at Kamwaura in the fertile Molo region. Here 65 people sleep in tents and work their land during the day.A year-and-a-half after post-election violence brought bloodshed to Kenya, during which members of the Kalenjin ethnic group attacked the Kikuyu tribe of President Mwai Kibaki, several thousand displaced people have still not returned home.

“I just came back from my farm. Today, I found that they have again uprooted my potatoes,” she said. “Since February, I’ve been going to my farm on a daily basis. We can’t stock any harvest, it’s been stolen.”I’m very careful not to stay too late in my shamba. I don’t know what can happen when it’s dark.”

“I can’t trust these people (Kalenjin) any more. They told us they had no problem with us, and a few months later they were killing us.

“Life is miserable here. Before I had wealth accumulated and today I have nothing to eat,” said Jane, who survives on one meal a day.Spurred by economic reasons and encouraged by the government, a number of Kikuyu families began migrating in the 1960s from their traditional central provinces to the Rift Valley, the “ancestral home” of the Kalenjin.Land here is an explosive issue due to unbalanced distribution and population pressures in a poor, mainly agricultural country.Lucy Muthoni, 48, says she doesn’t understand why her neighbours continue to rip up her plants.

“They even told me there was no point in planting maize, since I might no longer have access to my land at harvest time,” she said.”Personally, I don’t think we can ever heal the rift between us and the Kalenjin. They betrayed us.”Like other displaced people who believe the government has not tightened security enough, Lucy does not want to claim compensation and buy a plot of land at Kamwaura. She wants to continue to run her farm.

At Rai farm, in the Eldoret region, one of the worst hit by the violence in the Rift Valley, huge areas of agricultural land have been turned to dust by a long-running drought.Njunguna Gachui has built a flimsy house with bits of wood for windows and a plastic tarpaulin for a roof.”I had 60 sheep, some cows. At the age of 70 I have to begin a new life,” he said. “My children’s future has been destroyed because I lost my property.” His daughter, Catherine Njoki, said the government had offered little in the way of assistance.”They promised they would build a house for us but they never delivered on their promises.”It will be very hard to reconcile fully with the neighbours. It will take a long time for the trust to come back. Everyday you can see what has been destroyed.”

Relations are strained with one neighbour in particular, a former Kenyan athlete whom, they allege, gave petrol to youths to burn down their house so he could get their land. Benjamin Ngaruiya, one of the displaced people at Rai farm, said the 10 000 shillings (about R1 000) he received is not enough to build a decent home and buy fertiliser to begin farming again.Only his father and mother have been resettled in a simple house on their plot of land that was devastated during the violence.

The government likes to point out that all the big camps created at the time of the violence have now been closed.One local official even told  the AFP the displaced people were trying to benefit by holding out for better land.

Ngaruiya denied the claim. “These officials from the government are only touring towns,” he said. “They never come inside the rural zones. They ignore us.”His father Michael Nyanga Njeru recalls the days when there were four homes on his property. All have been reduced to rubble. Still he remains defiant.”I’m not going to leave this land, because it’s my property. We bought it legally. I’m not going anywhere else. I will be buried here.”

June 30, 2009

Karanja From Daily Kos Takes on The Iranian Election

Karanja’s Dairy(daily Kos) -I am a fire breathing liberal, and a huge Obama supporter, for which reason, I liked the idea of an Ahmadinejad loss in the recent Iranian elections, particularly given that the storyline that was developing was that his loss would be translated as a win for Obama’s softly softly approach toward Iran and as an endorsement by the Iranian people (whom conservatives like to proclaim they have no quarrel with – even as they support sanctions that would weaken the Iranian economy wreaking havoc to those very Iranian people’s lives) of his extension of an open hand of friendship and open dialogue. Alas, the election did not go as I had hoped, against the slim odds that Mir-Hossein Mousavi might have toppled Ahmadinejad. Slim odds, in my opinion, because as all news media admitted in the lead up to the election, the close polls that were coming out of Iran were questionable, at best, and even if they had been accurate, the best case scenario would have suggested that the election would turn on turnout, and would have gone to whomever would succeed in getting out their supporters. I would argue that in fact it is quite likely that the polls would have unduly skewed toward the opposition, given that the opposition’s support was centered in the urban areas, and among the young and educated elites within the country, who would have access to telephones and other telecommunications technology and hence may very well have been over-polled.

This would suggest to me that in fact the polls showing Mousavi running almost even with Ahmadinejad could not be relied on as an indication of national sentiment right across Iran. Ahmadinejad according to all media reports enjoyed greater support from the majority of the rural population, who have benefitted hugely from his policies. Those people live outside Tehran, do not Tweet, and possibly have little reason to take to the streets, particularly given that their man got back in office. Whatever you think of Iran, and its system of government, Ahmadinejad was elected democratically four years ago, and has ruled in accordance with a relatively free, fair and democratic Iranian system, which contrary to popular belief is actually one where dissent takes place in relative openness and without crackdowns as most would prefer to believe. That the supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is an unelected official and the true Iranian Head of State is certainly a situation that is suspect in mine, as well as in the eyes of many, but then again, I can’t believe the United Kingdom, the other country whose nationality I hold, has a Monarch as the official Head of Sate.

Furthermore, the Supreme Leader was installed as a result of the Theocracy that followed the Iranian Revolution that ousted the Shah of Iran, who btw, had been installed by the United States interfering with and ousting the democratically elected Iranian government of the time in 1953. With regard to the British Monarchy, I am personally super offended that my taxes go to support a whole family and their cousins and aunts and uncles, who also happen to be the world’s wealthiest welfare dependents, but that’s just me. So, with that out of the way, the idea that this election was not free and fair is not a foregone conclusion. The fact that the demonstrators are fighting a dictator is not necessarily one that is borne out by all the facts. That they are demonstrating against a leader they did not vote for and whom they do not like is certainly clear. That the elections were rigged is certainly not clear either. Therefore, to continue to encourage the Iranian people to demonstrate against the election is not necessarily responsible. Senator Saxby Chambliss of GA, went on Chris Mathews declaring that the election was stolen and calling on President Obama to call it as such. This is hugely irresponsible, and is not backed by any facts whatsoever. President Obama, as usual is ahead of most everyone else, and has struck exactly the right tone on the question of the Iranian elections. As he pointed out, not only is there no guarantee that Mousavi would be dramatically different, but there really is nothing to suggest that Mousavi won, other than that his supporters are certainly very passionate, and clearly do not accept that Ahmadinejad won. Surely if Ahmadinejad was the tyrannical dictator that it has been suggested he was, I can’t imagine that we would have seen the relative calm surrounding the demonstrations that we have seen, notwithstanding the eight deaths that were reportedly caused by Ahmadinejad’s supporters, and not by official government personnel.

Many news reports have admitted that it is not clear that Mousavi won, and in fact, the only extent to which many have gone was to argue that Ahmadinejad could not have won by the margins that it is claimed he won. I argue that in fact it is highly credible that he did win by larger than expected margins, given the heavy skew in favor of the opposition, that I believe the polls would have had, and given a possible higher turnout among the rural vote that supports Ahmadinejad than the urban (more visible, more tweetable) vote. We in the west had absolutely no opportunity whatsoever to gage the rural support for Ahmadinejad, and furthermore, given that they may not have even viewed President Obama’s extension of friendship, may not have necessarily cared for greater engagement with the west, and hence may well not have cared for a change of government. I come from Kenya, and during the recent turmoil that followed the disputed elections of December 2007, I saw similar kneejerk reactions in the west in support of the opposition, calling for President Kibaki who had won in a closely contested election, to back down and or negotiate to end the impasse.

What most in the west were not privy to, was that the opposition were in fact a murderous bunch of thugs who killed over a thousand government supporters and tried to ethnically cleanse the government supporting members of the Kikuyu tribe from opposition strongholds, leading to hundreds of thousands displaced form their homes and ending up as internally displaced people, who to this day remain displaced, over two years later! It was not convenient to report this particularly given that the opposition was seen as more pro-western, which in fact they were. It is not that the Kenyan government is anti-western, but in fact the reality is that the opposition was far more malleable towards western manipulation, with the opposition leader, Raila Odinga having close ties to the MI6, and having enjoyed the support of British business backers, who stood to gain from greater exploitation of Kenya in a Raila administration. In that election, just like in the Iranian, there was no clear evidence that the incumbent had not indeed won, but furthermore, there was evidence that the opposition had been less than honest and transparent in their strongholds, having started their murderous rampage on the eve of the election, killing security personnel who had been sent to man polling stations within the strongholds of the opposition in Western and Nyanza provinces.

The US and Britain were impatient with President Kibaki, I believe who had refused all western aid, having succeeded in turning Kenya into a self dependent economy that was growing at a 7% rate annually and running purely on tax revenues. One example of his refusal to play ball was when he refused George Bush’s “so called” aid for HIV AIDS programs, which came with the strings attached of having to spend the money on US patented drugs, which cost so much more than generics that Kenya could have obtained from India and Brazil. It is therefore with such examples that I tread the free Iran bandwagon with great care, knowing that I do not understand enough about internal Iranian politics to jump to the conclusion that a) Iran is not Democratic and that b) that Mousavi won the last election. As far as I can see, there are demonstrations against an election result that a good number of Iranians, quite possibly almost half of the population disagree with. Can you even begin to imagine if the nearly half of the American electorate that voted for Senator McCain had refused to accept the election results last year, and decided to take to the streets? That would be seriously huge numbers and would certainly produce the same results as what we are seeing in Iran.

Granted that is a distant possibility, but take for example, Gore vs. Bush in 2000. That election was even closer, and was disputed and remains disputed to this day. That is one situation where demonstrations could have taken place, and indeed did take place. But can you imagine what it would have looked like if masses of Democrats had felt strongly enough to come out for big demonstrations. I certainly think that people actually did feel strongly enough and would have come out en masse if Gore had encouraged it. He did not. Moussavi has been encouraging the demonstrations, and so has the western media in their one sided coverage. I am just not convinced that the western view will be borne out by the facts on this occasion. I support the right of the Iranian people to demonstrate in peace, without the fear of violence or retribution, but this seems to be the case right now. I support the right of the Iranian people to demand exactly what sort of government they want to see, and indeed to question their election results if they do not feel that they were fair and transparent enough. I will however, not jump on the bandwagon of jumping to the conclusion that this half, if that, of the Iranian population is the only true point of view. I also wholeheartedly agree with President Obama’s decision to sit this one out, and I believe that time will prove him right to have done so very soon, and I sincerely hope that he does not cave to the right’s demands to throw himself any further into the melee.

By Karanja- A liberal American Blogger on Daily Kos

http://karanja.dailykos.com/

June 6, 2009

Acceptance of killing of Innocent Kikuyus

*By Wangari Maathai -Nobel Peace Prize winner

With the pervasive demonisation of the Mungiki militia group providing an effective cover for the killing of members of the Kikuyu community – Mungiki and non-Mungiki alike – ordinary citizens are reluctant to speak out, both for fear of being accused of supporting the sect and of the reactions of Mungiki militia to criticism. Calling on the political and religious leadership of the Kikuyu community to face up to the challenge in its midst, Maathai urges the country to heal the growing rift between the community and other Kenyans.

Mungiki

Mungiki

In the course of history everywhere in the world, it is the leadership of the day that guides its people towards peace or war, poverty or wealth, development or collapse, slavery or freedom. And so it is with Kenya’s current leadership, a leadership which is failing to see the signs of anger and frustration of those they govern even though the writing is on the wall. Since the rupture over the infamous Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2003, the referendum on the constitution, the general elections and the subsequent fallout from them, Kenya has continued to slide dangerously backwards.

In 2008, thanks to a quick response from the African Union and the international community, Kenya was saved from the brink and a National Accord was arrived at to allow the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) to declare a ceasefire, share power and work towards national cohesion and reconciliation. Kenya was given a new lease of life but since then the leadership has wasted away that second chance as it continues to compete and play politics with only 2012 in mind. In the past, the failure to recognise danger signs were the reason why some people expressed shock and dismay that deadly post-election violence could happen in Kenya in 2007-08. Such people had believed that Kenya was a peaceful country. Unfortunately, that perception was because people ignored the danger signs and lived a lie. To such people the tribal clashes of 1991, 1992 and 1997 were quickly forgotten. Yet during those earlier clashes, as in 2007-08, distress calls to the police for help were ignored. Many people died, and more were maimed, raped and displaced, while much property was destroyed. Again, once politicians shared power and privileges, nobody was held responsible for those crimes. Everything was swept under the carpet and was quickly forgotten. As it turned out, the clashes of the 1990s proved to be rehearsals for the post-election violence of 2007-08 and in all cases the violence was largely directed at the Kikuyu community.

Currently, the danger signs are palpable. Instances of citizens being murdered in cold blood in cases where no robbery is involved, or citizens shouting down leaders at public rallies – such as happened during Jamhuri Day (12 December 2008) and Labour Day (1 May 2009) – or youth uprooting the railway, engaging police in gun battles in rural towns, or engaging in killing orgies of defenceless villagers, are all signs of a society that is falling apart and losing respect for the rule of law. The government knows that the violence and killings are largely perpetrated by members of militia groups, which are created and funded by politicians. Different communities have their militia, which bear different names. The government knows these militia groups and knows that politicians use them to punish and defeat their opponents, especially during elections. If they win elections, the same politicians end up in government and become part of the leadership.

Mungiki, which is currently making headlines, is the militia group from the Kikuyu community. Information about the group is kept secret, but unconfirmed reports indicate that this militia is split into several groups. The original Mungiki members were only interested in pursuing the Kikuyu form of worship, which prays facing Mt. Kenya. This group does not believe in Christianity and calls for the traditional Kikuyu way of life, including practicing female circumcision. Owing largely to its stand on those two issues, the strongly christianised Kikuyu community has been unsympathetic towards this group and has largely demonised the sect. The banning of the sect by the government has criminalised it, and therefore the community and Kenyans in general have tolerated the extrajudicial killing of its members.The police have taken advantage of this demonisation and criminalisation to kill Mungiki indiscriminately, because they know that they will not be called to account. Why the members of the sect are denied freedom of worship, in a country where everybody else can worship as they please, is not clear. Indeed it is only among the Kikuyu community that worshiping in a traditional way is demonised, criminalised and the killing of followers is tolerated.

The second group camouflages itself as Mungiki but is said to be comprised of militiamen being recruited from thousands of unemployed youth. With the failure of the cash crop economy, impoverishment and the introduction of drugs and illicit alcoholic drinks in the Central region, it has been easy to recruit youth and men into militia groups. Criminality gradually infiltrated some of these militia groups, especially as they sought ways to sustain themselves beyond the handouts from their sponsors. Therefore, they become available to politicians and others for hire. They are the type we encounter protecting grabbed public lands or properties built on stolen land. Sometimes they may receive police protection, an indication of their political patronage.

The third group is claimed to be closely connected to the law enforcement arm of the government and is used to collect information, intimidate and instil fear in citizens, terrorise matatus and silence elements like dissidents, activists and competing elements. It may also provide ‘protection’ or other services for a fee. These are the ones people accuse of hiring police guns to commit crimes.

In some cases the militiamen and the law enforcement arm of the government form a symbiotic relationship, which sometimes goes sour with either of them getting killed. When militiamen are killed they are labelled thieves and members of the Mungiki sect. That is usually an indication that the matter get closed and no further action is expected. Because of the internalised disdain of the Mungiki sect, especially in the Kikuyu community, the expected outcry against their killings has been absent and nobody in the community wants to be seen supporting Mungiki. At the same time Mungiki has instilled so much fear in the community that nobody is willing to speak about them or their actions for fear of immediate elimination.Therefore, when innocent persons are killed and are labelled Mungiki, death is stoically accepted as the will of God and the community internalises the pain. Killing members of Mungiki, irrespective of their innocence, has became so acceptable that all that police have to claim to literally get away with any murder is to say that the victim was a member of Mungiki. Unfortunately, that has degenerated into acceptance of killing of innocent Kikuyus. Currently this is further degenerating into members of Mungiki turning on the community itself in a cycle of vengeance and tit-for-tat.

The recent murder of the son of the former member of parliament for Gatundu North, Hon. Kariuki Muiruri, painfully exemplifies the tragedy and the dilemma that the Kikuyu community faces. The son was shot dead by a plainclothes policeman, who subsequently walked into a police station and wrote in the Occurrence Book (OB) that he had killed a thief who was also a member of the Mungiki sect! Yet the son was on holiday and the two met casually at a social place. Whatever the circumstances that led to the shooting of the son, this was a case of an innocent young man killed by a policeman who knew that nothing would happen to him if he were to record that the man was a member of the Mungiki sect. But for the fact that the victim was the son of a former member of parliament and a former assistant minister, Muiruri’s son would have joined the list of thousands of Kikuyu youth who have been killed under similar circumstances and labelled thieves and members of the Mungiki sect.

The Mungiki phenomenon, almost like the Mau Mau experience five decades ago, is providing cover for extrajudicial killings, intimidation, harassment, criminalisation and the bashing of the Kikuyu community under the pretence that police are protecting citizens from Mungiki. Sometimes police are fully aware of the activities carried out by this group. The killings in Mathira and Kirinyaga, for example, are said to have been committed with full knowledge of the law enforcement arm of the government. Indeed, citizens claim that distress calls to the police for help were never responded to until the killings had been completed. The extrajudicial killings of innocent Kenyans have been attracting international attention. This is because not only is the state perceived to be failing in protecting its citizens, but the police are being blamed for some of the deaths. Promises to carry out a thorough investigation come to nothing, and nobody has been held to account. After all, the police cannot be expected to investigate and incriminate themselves.

Perhaps militia groups like Mungiki have gotten out of hand. But is the right response to militia groups a license to kill them indiscriminately? We are not in a state of war, and nobody should be killed without following the due process of the law of the land, police excuses for self-defence notwithstanding. Police Commissioner Hussein Ali will find it hard to explain how in his era Kenya has experienced a level of carnage at the hands of the police greater than at any other time, even when compared with the colonial era. When the government sends the message that the Mungiki group should be crushed, it is an endorsement for extrajudicial killings. For their part, the militiamen will subsequently go on a killing spree to avenge members killed. This cycle of death has become a common feature, has instilled fear and has given rise to frustration in the people of Central Kenya.

The way I see it, the political and religious leadership of the Kikuyu community should rise to the challenge facing the entire community. This is a community that suffers from accumulated trauma and frustration extending back to the beginning of the colonial era. From the latest attack during the post-election violence, the community has yet to bury their dead, settle the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and send their children back to school. A culture of Kikuyu bashing, criminalisation and isolation is being perpetrated and is quickly entrenching itself, creating a deep rift between the community and other Kenyans. The fact that this is happening when the national leadership in State House is from the community is doubly tragic. How can they be so bashed, so criminalised, killed, displaced and humiliated when their beloved son is in State House? Will he wait until he or members of his family are touched by the tragedy afflicting the community? If they are now encouraged to turn on each other, there will be no shortage of helping hands, including being given guns to kill their own children! For a country awash with militia groups, these are dangerous signs not only for the Kikuyu community, but for Kenya as a whole. The question I would ask Prime Minister Raila Odinga is, have you not heard the cries or seen the tears of these Kenyans in your capacity as the coordinator of government business? Have you not seen the mourning mothers?

March 13, 2009

Machetes, then Machineguns

Copyright © 2009 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

The recent shooting of two prominent Kenyan human-rights campaigners in broad daylight in Nairobi, the country’s capital, has darkened the national mood just when Kenya’s fragile coalition government is showing signs of stress and the global recession is beginning to batter the economy anew. The campaigners, Kamau King’ara and Paul Oulo, had been investigating death squads widely thought to be linked to senior politicians, so it was immediately assumed that the pair had been silenced by orders from on high.

Mr King’ara had said that at least 1,700 young Kenyans had been shot or tortured to death by death squads during President Mwai Kibaki’s first term in office between 2002 and 2007, while another 6,500-plus had disappeared, probably also at the hands of government goons. His was not an isolated allegation. Last month Philip Alston, a UN investigator, published a report documenting around 500 death-squad executions in the months leading up to the election of December 2007, whose disputed results led to 1,500 or so deaths and the displacement of at least 300,000 Kenyans in the subsequent violence. Mr Alston, an Australian, called for the chief of police, Hussein Ali, and the attorney-general, Amos Wako, to resign. They show no sign of doing so.Hours before the two campaigners were killed, the government’s spokesman accused Mr King’ara of raising funds for the feared Mungiki, a gang of thugs (mainly Kikuyus, members of Kenya’s largest and richest ethnic group) who have terrorised people in the area around Nairobi for several years. Human-rights groups say this is nonsense, and Mr Alston has called for an independent investigation into the killings. Raila Odinga, prime minister in Kenya’s increasingly shaky coalition government, said America’s FBI should be called in, a suggestion perhaps designed to embarrass security ministers in Mr Kibaki’s part of the coalition.

Speculation as to the killers’ motives abounds. Some suggest that policemen suspected of setting up and running the death squads were furious that they were being investigated, especially since the politicians who are presumed to have given the go-ahead have got off scot-free. A death-squad member had already been hunted down and killed after blowing the whistle. A local investigative journalist was beheaded, possibly by the police.Apologists for Kenya’s Criminal Investigation Department and other units say the police have been performing a patriotic duty. Most of the murdered men whose cases were documented by Mr Alston were suspected of having sworn an oath of allegiance to the Mungiki, who attract their young adherents with a blend of Kikuyu revivalism, nostalgia for anti-colonial Mau Mau rebels, Jamaican and American street culture, and community action. Some say the death squads were told to wipe out a generation of Mungiki leaders to ensure that poor young Kikuyus stay loyal to Mr Kibaki, who heads the old Kikuyu establishment. The police also wanted to curb the Mungiki’s crimes, particularly their habit of extorting money from bus drivers and passengers. Mr Alston’s findings have been well received by the Mungiki, who have since held marches in Nairobi and smaller Kikuyu-populated towns.

If they mutate from being tribal chauvinists into class warriors, the Mungiki may start to menace the old guard. The rising cost of food, soaring unemployment and the grimness of life in the huge slums abutting central Nairobi may open up space for a potent new movement that could cut across ethnic lines. “A thousand death squads won’t deal with all these angry young men,” says a local observer.In any event, the grand coalition government put together less than a year ago after the disputed elections may be buckling under the weight of its own inadequacy. Corruption and mismanagement are still rife. The government has created an “eat-and-let-eat” dispensation, with officials from both ends of the coalition pilfering the country’s resources. Even if it were being well governed, Kenya would have to sprint just to stand still, since the population is continuing to balloon; from less than 8m at independence in 1963, it now exceeds 37m. The infrastructure continues to fall to bits, health care and education are patchy. Land reform, a topic that stirs angry feelings, particularly between competing ethnic groups, has still not been addressed.

Some 4m Kenyans now rely on food aid. The number in absolute poverty is up. So is unemployment. The Kenyan shilling is overpriced and set to be sharply devalued. The government cannot meet its budget targets. Banks and mobile-phone firms enjoyed big profits in 2008 but manufacturing and tourism will dive as the global recession bites. Kenya’s exports of cut flowers, coffee, tea and fruit may shrink.If the economy were less grim, the shenanigans of the country’s politicians might be amusing. Instead, they are making Kenyans feel bitter. Mr Odinga’s Orange movement has threatened to leave the coalition; its leaders say it is stuck in a “marriage without conjugal rights”. Then off you go, say the allies of President Kibaki, whose Party of National Unity has the choicest ministries. Far from giving a lead when he recently held a rare press conference, Mr Kibaki merely took the opportunity to declare that he was no polygamist.

Messrs Odinga and Kibaki have both broken promises to deliver politicians and businessmen who stirred up violence after the elections of 2007 for trial in Kenya or the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Several detailed reports have named a slew of senior figures on both sides of the political divide. A growing fear is that the next crisis may see an escalation from machetes to machineguns. It is by no means certain that Kenya’s fragile political peace can last until the next general and presidential elections, due in 2012.

February 6, 2009

Protected: Kenya we want

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January 29, 2009

IDPs

Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe.If we wash our hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless  it means we side with the powerful, not to be neutral.

Now my friends, I am opposed to the system of society in which we live today, not because I lack the natural equipment to do for myself but because I am not satisfied to make myself comfortable knowing that there are thousands of my fellow men who suffer for the barest necessities of life.

We were taught under the old ethic that man’s business on this earth was to look out for himself. That was the ethic of the jungle; the ethic of the wild beast. Take care of yourself, no matter what may become of your fellow man. Thousands of years ago the question was asked; ”Am I my brother’s keeper?” That question has never yet been answered in a way that is satisfactory to civilized society.

Yes, I am my brother’s keeper. I am under a moral obligation to him that is inspired, not by sentimentality but by the higher duty I owe myself.

January 16, 2009

The Curse of Negative Ethnicity

While my number one wish for 2009 is resettlement of the internally displaced, I feel that history defines governments and leaders, not by their claims to greatness, but by great goals they may have achieved or the unforgettable tragedies they may have caused or resolved.To earn a mention in history, leaders require tremendous courage or cowardice. Speaking of courage in leadership and human survival, Sir Winston Churchill said: “Courage is the first and most important attribute of human beings because it ensures the presence of all others.”If courage is the greatest virtue in politics, cowardice is the greatest vice. Courage has made nations great and cowardice destroyed many. Indeed we owe what we enjoy to courage and what we suffer to cowardice.Remember, courage is not killing and silencing critics but liberating the downtrodden by saying no to dictatorship, injustice and hunger.

Today, Europe, America and East Asia have been hoisted to the pinnacle of political and economic greatness by political generals of great valour like Churchill. On the other hand, Kenya and Africa in general, have been hurled into depths of unspeakable poverty by some of their leaders.In our case, if there is one example of political cowardice whose creation and failure to resolve will earn President Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga notoriety in history, it will be their midwifery of post-election violence, ethnic cleansing, displacement and abandonment of the displaced.Unavoidably, the displaced are a creation of President Kibaki’s lack of courage in defending those who voted for him, and Premier Odinga’s manifest unwillingness to defend the democratic rights of those who voted against him. The two seem to agree with Mr William Ruto that Kenya belongs to tribes, not Kenyans.In 1997, members of a community were killed for voting for Mr Kibaki. Powerless, they knew Kibaki could do nothing until he became president.

In 2003, I tabled in Parliament a motion for the resettlement of the displaced that was duly passed. President Kibaki and his two ministers of Lands, Mr Amos Kimunya and Prof Kivutha Kibwana, however, refused to resettle the displaced in pursuit of the votes of Rift Valley MPs in Parliament.By doing this, the President betrayed his MoU with the displaced the same way he had reneged on the one made with Mr Odinga.Architects of ethnic mayhem did not fail to notice this. When, during the 2007 elections, two communities voted for him, hundreds of thousands were attacked, killed and chased away from their lands.And though armed with executive powers, President Kibaki moved not a finger to protect them. He had intelligence that his supporters would be attacked, but he did not order the army to protect them.When they were attacked and killed, he sent soldiers to ethnically cleanse Rift Valley by taking the displaced away from their homes and lands. Since then, the Government has denied these people security to return to their farms, and also failed to give them alternative land.

To compound the problem, President Kibaki’s partner in Government, Raila, does not support either their return to their former lands or resettlement elsewhere. Like Kibaki, he too is scared of giving security to the returnees in fear of alienating the support of Rift Valley MPs.To court their support, the Prime Minister has also become a champion of majimbo, ethnic federalism that fuelled the post-election violence.Finally, because of voting for his adversary, Raila is quietly punishing the displaced with neglect the same way he spearheaded the disbandment of the Electoral Commission for refusing to pronounce him president.

Like heartless elephants locked in a permanent struggle for supremacy, the two principals have trampled on the rights of the displaced and condemned them to embarrassing landlessness and destitution.In the meantime, the two are running the Government like a cartel for the exclusive benefit of themselves, their families, business partners, cronies, foreign companies and the Qatari Government whom they have given 100,000 acres to grow food for their people, as the displaced die of hunger.

Mr Wamwere is the author of “Towards Genocide in Kenya: The Curse of Negative Ethnicity.

January 8, 2009

Grand Coalition(of Evil) Government Will Be Burried First

There is confusion in Rift Valley  over how to deal with bodies piled in the town of Eldoret’s morgue for more than a year.

The deceased died in a church burnt down by a mob during ethnic violence after elections in December 2007.Thirty-seven bodies were to have been buried on Wednesday but after the first 10 were interred they had to be dug up amid furious protests from relatives.Families want their loved ones laid to rest on ancestral lands but some bodies remain unidentified a year on. Eldoret, in the Rift Valley, was hardest hit by the clashes following the disputed presidential election, which left 1,500 people dead and hundreds of thousands homeless.The BBC’s Wanyama Chebusiri in Eldoret says furious families, some wailing with grief, demonstrated at Kiplombe cemetery on the outskirts of the town on Wednesday.

Tense stand-off

After a tense hour-long stand-off with armed police, the authorities agreed to disinter the bodies and take them back to the morgue.

We got the shock of our lives this morning when we came to discover that bodies have been removed from the hospital mortuary
Grieving relative in Eldoret
    

Our correspondent says some relatives are still awaiting DNA test results to positively identify their loves ones.

Families have said the victims should be buried in a mass grave beside the church if they cannot be identified.

Local community groups have objected and said the victims should be laid to rest on their own ancestral lands.

But up to 10,000 internally displaced people remain in Eldoret, a year on from the post-election bloodshed, and many fear being attacked if they go home.One of the grieving protesters at the graveyard told the BBC no official had made contact to inform them of the planned burials.”We got the shock of our lives this morning when we came to discover that bodies have been removed from the hospital mortuary,” he said.

The victims were among people from President Mwai Kibaki’s Kikuyu ethnic group who were seeking shelter in Kiambaa Pentecostal church when the building was torched by a mob.

Shocking BBC interview of Kalenjin Church Burners and Jackson Kibor

December 31, 2008

One Year On & the $130 Insult for IDPs

Mary Macharia will never go home again, even though a year has passed since ethnic tensions flared into violence after Kenya’s deeply flawed presidential election.Macharia’s 3-year-old daughter, Joyce Njoki, was among dozens of people she saw “burned to ashes” when a mob set fire to a church where hundreds were taking refuge in one of the crisis’ most horrific acts of violence. Macharia herself suffered burns over most of her body.

“Our leaders are the ones who instigated this whole thing and now they are pretending everything is back to normal,” Macharia, 40, told The Associated Press from a displacement camp where she lives outside the Kenyan capital.”I cannot live next to my enemies,” said Macharia, who spent eight months in the hospital receiving skin grafts and can no longer farm because her injuries are so debilitating.The tensions that were laid bare during one of the darkest moments in Kenya’s history are still festering, a year after its election on Dec. 27, 2007 unleashed weeks of ethnic violence that killed more than 1,000 people.

The evidence is everywhere: in the displacement camps where tens of thousands of people still live; in the divided towns where ethnic groups had lived side-by-side since independence from Britain in 1963; and in growing disillusionment with a coalition government accused of ignoring the roots of the crisis.”The lives of most Kenyans are no better today than they were a year ago,” said Ben Rawlence, a researcher at Human Rights Watch. “This is not the new chapter that Kenyans hoped for.”

The coalition government between President Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, who became prime minister under the deal, has held together, but observers say it has not done enough to address the causes of the violence or to root out corruption.The fighting erupted after ballot counting showing the challenger Odinga in the lead swung dramatically in Kibaki’s favor amid allegations of election fraud.Long embittered by the political and economic dominance of Kibaki’s Kikuyu tribe, voters from among Kenya’s 41 other tribes — including Odinga’s Luo — staged protests and riots that quickly escalated into horrific violence.After much wrangling, Kibaki and Odinga agreed to put politicians believed to have organized and funded the fighting to go before a special tribunal — keeping the cases from being sent to the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

But not everybody has hopes for justice.

In past years, government commissions set up to look at ethnic clashes have taken years to complete reports that then gathered dust. And observers say the time it took for the two leaders to agree on a trial points to deep antagonism that makes it difficult for them to govern together.

Still, many diplomats praised the men for at least trying to move the country forward, despite their differences.The American ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, said the tribunal was just one sign that the coalition government could make changes.”An enormous amount has happened,” he told The Associated Press. “The structure for change is being put in place.”"Grand coalitions are never love affairs,” said the German ambassador to Kenya, Walter Lindner, at a recent news conference in Nairobi.

There are indeed some bright spots.

Tourists are returning to Kenya’s safari parks and Indian Ocean beaches. The coalition government is holding despite the obvious strains. And national pride exploded over the election of Barack Obama — whose father was Kenyan — as U.S. president.

But Kenya faces a long road to recovery.

The rioting and ethnic clashes exposed deep divisions over land and economic inequality that have been ignored or exploited for political gain for decades. While the power-sharing deal ended much of the killing, Kenya lost up to $1 billion because of the turmoil.The Kenyan Red Cross says nearly 60,000 out of 350,000 displaced remain in camps. Less than half have gone home; nearly 130,000 are simply unaccounted for — either living with friends or family or moving from town to town.In many areas, especially in western Kenya, the violence brought a bloody end to decades of coexistence among Kenya’s ethnic groups, transforming the ethnic makeup villages, cities and towns. Some worry the change may be permanent, boding ill for democracy in this once-stable African country.

James Mugwiri, 56, lived for 19 years with his family outside Eldoret — the site of the church blaze that killed Macharia’s daughter. But Mugwiri, a Kikuyu, fled his 12 acres when the killings began, and lived for months at a sprawling fairground in Eldoret where guards kept watch for marauding gangs.He finally felt safe enough to return to town, but he has given up on reclaiming his land. He feels betrayed by the coalition government — which he had great hope for — saying the two men are happy now they have solidified their power.

Instead of going back to his farm, Mugwiri rents a home for $100 a month so he can flee again with no strings attached.

idps

idps

“What happened to us has forced us to live like birds on trees, ready to fly away in case anything happens,” he said.The government has given many of the displaced 10,000 Kenya shillings — about $130 — to resettle, an amount government spokesman Alfred Mutua acknowledges is a token sum.”The government is not in a position to compensate people, what people are being given is a token to help them maintain their daily needs,” he told the AP. “People always want more money,” he added. “It’s a token of appreciation. But it is also costing us. Ten-thousand shillings given to all these families is a lot of money.”

He did not detail how much money the government has given out, saying it was still being calculated. He did not return further calls for comment.Rose Wanjiru Karanja, 32, who lived for nearly a year in a camp in Naivasha, said the money was an insult.

“We are being ferried like goats,” she said from the back of a pickup truck, where some 70 women and children were traveling to a parcel of land they bought by pooling their government money.”We are going to build a slum. We owned farms and now we are going to build houses that are 10 feet by 10 feet. Even prisoners get better treatment — they eat well, they are driven in buses,” she said.

As for politics and the power of the vote, Karanja has no hope.”Now they are looking for our votes and they are living well, but they should not be forgiven,” she said of Kenya’s politicians. “They should be taken to the Hague.”

December 24, 2008

Human Rights Watch Letter On Special Tribunal Loopholes

TO-THE SERENA MEDIATION TEAM

Re: Draft Statute for the Establishment of a Special Tribunal

Human Rights Watch has consistently emphasized the importance of accountability for the human rights violations committed following the Kenyan polls in December 2007. Our researchers documented several patterns of serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force by the police, and ethnic-based attacks and reprisals by militia groups on both sides of the political divide during the post-election. As a signatory to the Geneva Conventions and to various human rights treaties, and as a member of the International Criminal Court, Kenya is obligated to bring to justice perpetrators of serious international crimes.

Human Rights Watch welcomed the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), and congratulates the government of Kenya on its intention to introduce a bill establishing a Special Tribunal with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes committed in the post-election violence, consistent with the CIPEV’s recommendations.

We continue to urge the government to address wider human rights abuses in Kenya. Promptly constituting the special tribunal will be an important step forward, and we believe that ensuring its effectiveness will contribute significantly to ending the wider problem of impunity in Kenya. As a national court with jurisdiction to try serious international crimes, the special tribunal will also make an important contribution within the developing system of international justice.

The tribunal’s success will require close attention to credible, independent, and impartial investigation and prosecution, rigorous implementation of internationally recognized standards of fair trial, and appropriate penalties in the event of convictions. It will also require that the tribunal’s jurisdiction reach the crimes and perpetrators most representative of post-election violence.

To meet these challenges, it is essential that the tribunal be provided with a sound framework. As a human rights organization with extensive experience both in documenting human rights violations in Kenya and in monitoring and assisting national and international tribunals, Human Rights Watch would like to highlight a number of concerns with provisions of the draft statute prepared by the government that may undermine its effectiveness.

Human Rights Watch’s most pressing concerns are elaborated below, but the following list, long as it is, is not exhaustive:

Relationship to Kenyan law

Drawing on Kenyan criminal law and procedure. As discussed in more detail below, and as partly envisaged by the draft statute, the special tribunal should be set apart from other Kenyan criminal courts by its autonomy, its focused jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by certain persons during a certain period, and by its complement of international staff. The tribunal may also bring important innovations, including, as provided for in the draft statute, victim participation, a Defense Office to increase the protections afforded defendants, and a victim and witness protection unit. In doing so, the tribunal should draw on the experiences of other international and mixed international-national tribunals prosecuting serious international crimes.

The tribunal, however, should also comprise part of the ordinary Kenyan criminal justice system and draw on Kenyan substantive and procedural law, including, as discussed below, the recently adopted International Crimes Bill.

Doing so will make clear its relationship to other Kenyan authorities on which it will rely in its work, including prison and police authorities. It will ensure full protection of fair trial and other rights under Kenyan law to the defendants appearing before it. It will increase the tribunal’s efficiency by providing a sound basis for the tribunal’s own rules of evidence and procedure. And if the procedures of the special tribunal are similar to those of the ordinary Kenyan criminal courts, Kenyan judges, counsel, and other judicial staff working for the tribunal will be able to bring their experience directly back to the ordinary courts increasing the capacity of Kenyan institutions to provide accountability.

The draft statute should provide that the special tribunal is to be bound by Kenyan law except to the extent provided otherwise by its statute. In developing its rules of procedure and evidence, the statute in article 16 should instruct judges to be guided by Kenyan law in addition to international criminal law and practice.

Relationship with existing Kenyan courts.

The draft statute currently provides the tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over crimes under the statute. As indicated above, however, the tribunal will not have the capacity to prosecute all perpetrators. Providing the tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction could thwart or delay the efforts of the ordinary Kenyan courts to bring these other perpetrators to justice. Instead, the statute should provide for concurrent jurisdiction, while giving the tribunal primacy over cases within its jurisdiction. A clear procedure should be provided for transfer of cases between ordinary Kenyan courts and the tribunal.

Anchoring the tribunal in the constitution. The Kenyan constitution permits parliament to establish courts subordinate to the High Court. To ensure the special tribunal’s independence, and as recommended by the CIPEV, it is essential that the Kenyan constitution be amended to permit creation of a special tribunal that is independent of the High Court, and the decisions of which are not subject to appeal to any other body. The draft statute appropriately provides for an appeal chamber within the tribunal. Any process of constitutional amendment should additionally ensure that the tribunal is fully able to exercise its jurisdiction free of constitutional challenge.

Jurisdiction

Persons most responsible. As recommended by the CIPEV, the special tribunal should focus its attention on a limited pool of perpetrators. The number of perpetrators of crimes during the post-election period likely runs to the thousands; without limiting the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal will be quickly overwhelmed by its caseload. Prosecution of lower level perpetrators should remain the responsibility of the ordinary Kenyan courts.

We recommend, however, that rather than use the language “persons bearing the greatest responsibility” as recommended by the CIPEV, article one of the statute should limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction to “persons most responsible.” According to the United Nations Secretary-General, the term “persons most responsible” includes those in the political or military leadership, but would also comprise others down the chain of command who may be regarded as “most responsible” judging by the severity of the crime or its massive scale. While the primary focus of the tribunal should be senior leaders-the individuals most often beyond the reach of ordinary courts and whose prosecution can expose the structure of criminality that led to the commission of widespread crimes-defining the tribunal’s jurisdiction by reference to “persons most responsible” would permit a degree of flexibility in pursuing lower ranking officials if necessary for the overall prosecutorial strategy.

Time period.

The draft statute presently provides in article seven for the tribunal’s jurisdiction over crimes committed during the “period beginning on 1st December 2007 and ending on 28th February 2008, or crimes committed on any earlier or later date and which are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and gravity similar to those crimes committed between 1st December 2007 and 28th February 2008.” The broad wording of this provision leaves room for considerable argument as to what falls within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and, if given the broadest possible interpretation, could stretch the tribunal’s caseload beyond its capacity. We suggest that to retain some flexibility, the statute gives the tribunal itself the power to extend its period to “Crimes under its statute, of a similar nature to and connected with those committed between 1 December 2007, and 28 February 2008,” with the tribunal itself in those cases naming the time periods to which its jurisdiction will extend.

Impartiality and national reach.

Although the draft statute provides for the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the entire territory of Kenya, the preamble of the statute should explicitly refer to the need for impartial investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by all parties to the post-election violence in any of Kenya’s eight provinces. For example, crimes committeed in Mt. Elgon during the above time frame were most certainly related to the election, even if the genesis of the instability there preceded the 2007 elections.
Substantive offenses

International Crimes Bill.

As presently drafted, the statute of the special tribunal lacks precision in its definition of crimes. Of particular importance, “gross violations of human rights” (article 3) does not correspond to any clearly defined crime under international law, and, as defined in the draft statute, broadens the tribunal’s jurisdiction to include almost any serious crime. The focus of the tribunal-which will have limited prosecutorial and judicial resources-should be more narrow.

We understand that the International Crimes Bill has recently been adopted by parliament. This bill implements the Rome Statute of the ICC in national law, including by making genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes-as those crimes are defined by the Rome Statute-substantive offenses under Kenyan law and subject to prosecution by Kenyan authorities.

We urge the Kenyan parliament to link the International Crimes Bill to the special tribunal’s statute, and to define the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction in part by reference to war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in that bill. Tthe statute should direct the judges to interpret the definition of crimes in accordance with international law, including the Rome Statute.

However, given that there is no indication that genocide was committed during post-election violence, there is no need to include the crime of genocide within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Instead, it would make more sense to include other offenses. While the tribunal should focus primarily on serious international crimes, the statute’s drafters should consider including within the tribunal’s jurisdiction other offenses defined under Kenyan law, such as murder and sexual violence crimes, as needed to permit full prosecution of those most responsible for post-election violence.

Torture.

As a major international crime, torture should also be included in the tribunal’s jurisdiction, taking the definition from the Convention Against Torture, that is, any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

Individual criminal responsibility.

Article six of the draft statute makes available certain theories of individual criminal responsibility that go beyond direct commission of the crime. Such theories, including command responsibility and other forms of participating in planning and execution of the crimes, are essential where trial of leaders is anticipated. To ensure that all appropriate theories of criminal responsibility are included and are defined in a manner consistent with international law, we recommend that the statute refer to article seven of the International Crimes Bill, which will incorporate the principles of individual criminal responsibility and the responsibility of commanders and other superiors found in articles 25 and 28 respectively of the Rome Statute.

Judges and prosecutors

Commonwealth judges. An impartial and competent bench is a key fair trial right under Kenyan and international law. Transparency in the selection of judges will be of utmost importance.
We welcome the qualifications for appointment of all judges set out in article 13. Prior experience in criminal practice-whether in managing complex criminal trials in their national jurisdictions or experience before international criminal tribunals or mixed national-international tribunals- will be a particularly important qualification.

We also welcome provision in the draft statute for the tribunal’s chambers to be composed of a mix of international and national judges. International judges can contribute positively to the effective and impartial functioning of the tribunal. Consistent with the recommendations of the CIPEV, article 11 of the draft statute should provide for the non-Kenyan judges to be drawn from the Commonwealth. This will help to ensure a common legal background among the judges, adding to the efficiency of proceedings.

Investigative and prosecutorial resources.

Investigation and prosecution of serious crimes can be extremely complex. Demonstrating the systematic and widespread nature of crimes and the responsibility of perpetrators-who may have been leaders far removed from crime scenes-can pose tough challenges. International standards require prompt, thorough, independent, and impartial investigation and prosecution. The special tribunal must be equipped with adequate investigative and prosecutorial resources to meet these challenges and responsibilities.
We welcome the CIPEV’s recommendations and provision in the statute for international staff to work alongside Kenyan staff within the prosecutor’s office. Like international judges, international prosecutors and investigators can bring helpful expertise to the tribunal and complement the knowledge and experience of Kenyan staff. As currently provided for in the draft statute, we recommend that the prosecutor be non-Kenyan, and that, as recommended by the CIPEV, that the head of investigations and not less than three other members of the investigation team also be non-Kenyan. The draft statute should provide that the prosecutor have extensive experience trying criminal cases, and that investigators have experience in their own national jurisdictions, preferably in conducting police investigations.

Although the special tribunal should have sufficient personnel to carry out its own investigations, the tribunal’s personnel should have access to evidence collected prior to the tribunal’s establishment in cases that are subject to its jurisdiction, including investigative material, witness statements, and testimony collected and recorded by the CIPEV. The draft statute should provide for this transfer of evidence, and its admissibility and weight in proceedings before the tribunal should be subject to a determination by the tribunal’s trial chamber pursuant to Kenyan and international standards on the collection of evidence.

Additional chambers. Further consideration should be given to the provision in the draft statute on the creation of additional chambers. A better approach would be to appraise the likely caseload of the tribunal and equip it with sufficient capacity from the outset, including by drawing from the experiences of staffing international and mixed international-national tribunals. Selection of judges and professional judicial staff after the start of operations could create delays in proceedings.

Pre-trial judge. The draft statute provides in article 25 for pre-trial proceedings to be conducted by a pre-trial judge. While analogous pre-trial proceedings analogous to those set out in article 25 are conducted at the ICC, as far as we are aware, such proceedings are not provided for in ordinary Kenyan criminal procedure. If these proceedings are retained, specific provision should be made in the statute for the appointment of a chamber of pre-trial judges, rather than a single pre-trial judge, reflecting the same balance between international and national judges and qualifications as the trial and appeals chambers.

Terms of service. Given the nature of the proceedings the tribunal will conduct, judicial terms of three years are likely to be too short for the tribunal to carry out its mandate in full. We recommend that the tribunal’s mandate be open-ended, subject to review. Terms of service for judges should be open-ended, as currently provided in the draft statute for other tribunal staff. We would also recommend that provision be made for the tribunal to appoint a president from among its judges to assist in its management.
Fair trial rights and penalties

Rights under Kenyan and international law. While the draft statute provides a list of rights of suspects and accused in articles 31 and 32, the statute should explicitly provide for the applicability of all fair trial rights under Kenyan and international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Persons under the age of 18. The statute should exclude persons under the age of 18 from its jurisdiction, consistent with the practice of the International Criminal Court.

Trials in absentia. The draft statute should not permit the conduct of trials in absentia. Trials in absentia violate international law, which stipulates that a defendant should be present at his own trial.

Death penalty. We welcome provision in the draft statute for imprisonment as the primary penalty on conviction, and agree that terms of imprisonment should be determined with reference to international practice. Kenya should in any case abolish the death penalty immediately.

Barring commutation or pardon of sentence. The draft statute should bar commutation or pardon of sentences handed down by the special tribunal by any external authority to avoid political interference with its decisions.

Additional suggestions

Preamble.
The law would benefit from a preamble that refers to the need for and aims of the special tribunal. In addition to our earlier recommendation that such a preamble stress the tribual’s impartiality and national reach, a preamble might include the following references:

That it is established in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) led by Justice Waki;

That it is independent and autonomous and not subject to the control or direction of any other authority;
That its aim is to prosecute those most responsible for serious international crimes committed in connection with the 2007 Kenyan general elections;
That it is “anchored” in Kenya’s constitution;
That it will apply both Kenyan and international criminal law by virtue of the enactment of the International Crimes Bill 2008, making the provisions of the Rome Statue applicable in Kenyan domestic law;
That the tribunal will receive the full support and cooperation of the government of Kenya in its establishment and subsequent operations.

Cooperation. The cooperation of Kenyan authorities will be critical to the tribunal’s success. In addition to including references to cooperation in the preamble, the draft statute should compel the government to cooperate with the tribunal on a number of important issues, including the identification and location of persons; the taking of testimony and the production of evidence; the service of documents; the arrest or detention of persons; and the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the tribunal.
Immunities, commencement date of the tribunal, and expenses. Provision should be made in the tribunal’s statute for immunities of the tribunal and its officials, for determination of the tribunal’s commencement date following the enactment of its statute, and for the court’s expenses.

Resources. The tribunal should be provided with adequate resources from both national and international donors, to include the expense of all its operations, of investigation, of creation and to ensure its independence. It should not be forced to continually beg for funding from the government.
These suggestions are made to the government of Kenya in the hope that the draft law can be made more effective before it is passed by Parliament. Once the tribunal is established, other areas key to its effectiveness will need to be addressed in practice. These include implementation of the statute’s critical provisions on witness protection.

It is in the interests of all Kenyans that the country’s history of impunity on political violence be confronted. It is also in the interests of peace and stability in the country and the region. Kenya has a unique opportunity to take the lead in creating a domestic institution-with international assistance-that could deliver justice where previous attempts have failed. Additional efforts through the ordinary criminal courts will be required to bring full accountability.

Human Rights Watch remains committed to assisting the government of Kenya in ensuring that the perpetrators of human rights violations are held to account.

Yours sincerely,

Georgette Gagnon, Africa Director

Richard Dicker, International Justice Director

CC: Hon Raila Odinga

Hon Mwai Kibaki

December 21, 2008

Its A Political Hot Potato

From his tented refugee camp, James Karanga Ngugi seethed as he scanned a vast horizon of fallow, unoccupied land — most of it owned by two of Kenya’s most prominent political families.     

“Why do they have so much and I have nothing?” he asked.

His grandfather once prospered here, before he was displaced by British colonialists. After independence, villagers regained control, but were soon forced out again, this time by a rich Kenyan businessman with ties to the president.

As compensation, Ngugi received 10 acres of land about 100 miles away, but residents there, from a different tribe, always resented his presence. During the election turmoil late last year and early this year that grabbed headlines worldwide, his house and business were burned down.     

“Now I have to restart with nothing,” he said.As this East African nation struggles with food shortages, a sluggish economy and wounds from post-election violence, there’s a growing consensus that one issue rests at the heart of Kenya’s woes.

It’s the land, stupid.

All across Africa, battles over land continue to simmer, largely a fallout of European colonialism. During most of Africa’s history, sparse population and tribal traditions meant land was plentiful and disputes were rare. Colonialists introduced alien concepts such as borders and private ownership. Since independence began to sweep the continent 50 years ago, fledgling African governments have struggled to unwind injustices, sometimes with disastrous results. The Zimbabwean economy was devastated by President Robert Mugabe’s campaign to seize and redistribute land owned by white farmers.

Kenya suffered a similar colonial legacy, but has taken a different route. As is the case in many African nations, more than half of Kenya’s land is owned by a minority of its richest families, including some white foreigners. But unlike Zimbabwe and South Africa, where the struggle has pitted whites against blacks, the land here is owned mostly by Kenyan politicians who have grabbed millions of prime agricultural acres in questionable real estate deals over the last 45 years.”This is really an issue between us as Kenyans,” said Paul Ndungu, head of alandmark 2004 report that investigated more than 40 years of land fraud. “It’s Kenyan versus Kenyan.”Tribal clashes that killed more than 1,000 people after the disputed presidential election last December, were rooted largely in historic disputes over land. As Kenya struggles to feed its people, vast swaths of its most productive terrain sit idle and underutilized — and the land grievances remain unresolved.

“Peace, tranquillity and stability in Kenya is predicated on sorting out this land issue,” said Odenda Lumumba, head of the Kenya Land Alliance, a land-reform advocacy group.Newly installed Lands Minister James Orengo, a former student activist who was once jailed for aiding a 1982 coup attempt, has vowed to take on Kenya’s rich and powerful with a progressive new land policy.Among other things, he wants to reclaim stolen public lands, bar foreigners from owning property, introduce taxation on idle land and increase squatters’ rights.Orengo also is pushing to computerize Kenya’s aging system of land records, which hasn’t changed since colonial times. Paper records have made forgery and corruption easier. When one shady developer was investigated recently, police believe he covered his tracks by burning down the local survey office where records were stored.

Opposition is quickly building. Critics have dubbed Orengo the “doyen of radicalism.” One group of landowners said his “Marxist ideologies” would lead to a “Zimbabwe-style economic meltdown.”But Orengo’s biggest obstacle probably will come from within the government. Members of the political elite have been the nation’s biggest land grabbers over the decades, which is why Kenya never pursued land reform and redistribution, as other African nations did, experts say. Many of those leaders remain in power.”The people responsible for this mess still find themselves in government and they’ve used their influence to delay [reform],

” Ndungu said.His report named some of the nation’s most powerful leaders as benefiting from illegal deals, including members of parliament, ministers, judges, military commanders and local councilors. Opposition leaders also were singled out, including Prime Minister Raila Odinga, whose family reportedly benefited from a suspect deal involving a molasses plant.The study identified more than 300,000 titles as illegal and called for government seizure of as much as half a million acres. But the recommendations were never implemented. In fact, the previous lands minister initially tried to black out politicians’ names before releasing the report.Glaring disparities in Kenya’s land wealth began with British colonialists, who forcibly removed thousands of families from lush highlands so white farmers could grow coffee and tea.  

Rather than unwind the disputes after winning independence, Kenya’s founding fathers compounded the injustices, helping themselves to the departing colonialists’ spoils and even continuing forced resettlement schemes. Every Kenyan president has been accused of accumulating massive land holdings, diverting public properties to his tribe members and doling out real estate titles like candy to win votes.The family of Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s George Washington, sits on half a million acres, while his successor, Daniel Arap Moi, holds more than 100,000 acres, a government commission found. Current President Mwai Kibaki owns about 30,000 acres, according to local reports.

As long as the current crop of Kenyan leaders stays in power, Ndungu is pessimistic about reform’s chances. “I don’t see the political will,” he said.     

Orengo acknowledged that he faces an uphill battle, particularly in pushing his plan through the Cabinet. But he vowed to start reclaiming public lands, beginning with buyers and lessees of government land who have not developed the properties in accordance with their contracts.He is threatening to not renew 99-year leases with foreigners and descendants of white settlers, particularly if they are not maximizing use of the land or living up to lease commitments. He also wants to cancel all 999-year leases, which were negotiated by the British with unwitting tribal chiefs a century ago.Orengo said he planned to redistribute seized property to the landless or displaced, and said he wouldn’t hesitate to shame or embarrass politicians who refuse to return ill-gotten land.

“It’s a political hot potato,” he said. “But some critics will find it difficult to talk too loudly. There are people in the government who benefited immensely. It’s obscene.”

*LA Times ,Sunday 21st, 2008.

December 19, 2008

Kenya

This is Kenya

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October 15, 2008

Waki Report PDF


Waki Report PDF(click here)If files are unavailable  due to megabyte bandwidth please view ipaper link.iphone users can view and download ipaper here(click here)Also listen to the Shocking BBC interview of Kalenjin church burners and Jackson Kibor

 
 
 
 
 


October 12, 2008

Kibaki:A Failure in Leadership

Guest blogger Koigi Wa Wamwere (Former MP)

When leaders hoist themselves to the highest perch of power – the Presidency – they expose themselves to public scrutiny and judgement. When Kenyans fail to acknowledge their leaders’ failures, they do so at their own peril and pay dearly for the services those leaders fail to deliver.

What then will history say about President Kibaki? It will not say he was a great leader. It will say he had five cardinal failures.Kibaki’s supporters have always denied his cardinal sin of cowardice but posterity will judge him most harshly for his recent criminal failure to protect thousands of Kenyans who were killed and displaced in the worst ethnic fighting in our history.Kibaki is guilty because Government intelligence services informed him of who was planning war, where and against who but did nothing to protect innocent Kenyans who ended up dead or displaced. For his omission, he is as guilty of war as its perpetrators.

Kibaki

Kibaki

Kibaki’s second cardinal sin is that throughout his life, he has never fought for the freedom he has never hesitated to enjoy. Indeed, posterity will remember him most for equating fighting dictatorship with the madness of felling a fig tree with a razor blade.But fighting for freedom means sacrificing and Kibaki has never sacrificed for any cause, person or even self. Despite his lack of gratitude, others have always sacrificed for him.Kibaki’s third cardinal sin is his failure to acknowledge, thank and compensate freedom fighters or even those who have fought and sacrificed for him. Like one who has never heard that when a cow suffers injury in the pastures, it drags itself home for assistance, when freedom fighters and their families turn to him for acknowledgement and support, he looks the other way.

Without being taken to court, Kibaki’s government has refused to acknowledge, thank, compensate and apologise to freedom fighters for all the pain and ruin they suffered with their families. By failing to compensate freedom fighters, Kibaki’s fourth cardinal sin has been perpetuation of past injustices like corruption and ruin of freedom fighters. Mau Mau freedom fighters who lost land remain landless.Fighters for second liberation who lost their jobs and incomes remain destitute, hungry and sick. The State will pay them neither compensation nor pensions. Even their children lack employment because their parents could not educate them from graves or prisons.

The fifth cardinal sin of Kibaki comes to mind when you read about Italy’s recent paying Libya $5 billion for colonialism or Germany’s earlier compensation to Jews for holocaust.Unlike Gaddafi, Kibaki has failed to stand up to Britain for Kenya and demand both apology and compensation for colonialism, Mau Mau brutalities and wars of colonial conquest. Instead, like Kenyatta and Moi before him, Kibaki bows to Britain as if by colonising and robbing us, she did us a favour.But many Kenyans share Kibaki’s guilt. We supported and voted for his presidency, despite our clear knowledge of his weaknesses. Kenya must never fail with another leader the way it failed with Kibaki and Moi.

September 10, 2008

New Kenyan Opinion Poll Political Propaganda

According to a former top researcher with the Chicago-based National Opinion and Research Centre, B. Sheatsley, “opinion polls’ most obvious contribution has been to substitute objective measures of people’s opinions and behaviour for the guesswork that once surrounded these matters.”
In this sense, it becomes quite clear that something still does not work, the way opinion polls are conducted.

For instance, what does it exactly mean to ask a random group of people “who, between President Kibaki and Premier Raila Odinga, is working hardest?”This was the question Gullup recently asked in its only opinion poll this year. Just what was such a question supposed to mean?It is so subjective as to render it meaningless – certainly not the stuff of scientific polls. It comes out as having had pre-determined results, making it utterly baseless.Among those anonymous individuals asked to respond, who has any idea how the two spend their working day – the whole minutiae of crafting policies, studying situation papers and intelligence briefings, attending to various national chores, events and ceremonies, and meeting numerous delegations?

Except for the people who work in those offices, the answer is none.As far as any Kenyan can tell, both the President and Prime Minister have been on a hectic daily ever since the Grand Coalition was formed, each addressing the business of State.Just recently, when the President was off to an AU meeting in Egypt and another one in Japan, the Prime Minister was handling the toxic issues of the Grand Regency scandal and the Mau Forest.

Soon, he was off to the UK and the US, while President Kibaki was home grappling with domestic chores.This outward picture, which is the only idea that Kenyans have of the two at work, does not show any of them being busier or more lethargic than the other.It does not need repeating that the two leaders’ styles of doing things are diametrically opposed: that one is laid-back and the other more physically active.

It would be wrong for any Kenyan to think that being a hands-on operative equals hard work, though the PM does work hard, or that being “laid-back” means laziness.In many places, including large companies, many unsung people do the donkey-work, while the showy type get most of the limelight.
It does not make sense to equate two offices which have specific constitutional mandates, and which are serving the same government simultaneously.

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August 30, 2008

Africa Confidential:KHRC Violence Report -Names

August 30, 2008 at 5:36 AM- The state-funded Kenya National Commission on Human Rights has produced a researched but politically explosive report which links six government ministers to the violence that followed this year’s elections, when over 1,000 people died and some 350,000 were displaced (AC Vol 49 No 16). Although the KNCHR is yet to release the full list of the 209 people it named as involved in the violence, Muigwithania 2.0 and Africa Confidential have both obtained a copy which includes what the KNCHR describes as ‘a list of alleged perpetrators’ which it believes ‘provides a basis and a good starting point for further investigations’. The KNCHR emphasises that it is ‘not making any conclusions that the persons mentioned are guilty’. It insists that it has made every effort to ensure that the information about the named persons meets a threshold of credibility and that it has subjected the list to review by ‘independent persons’ and ‘national experts’.

Perpetrators
The KNCHR’s list of ‘alleged perpetrators’ includes six cabinet ministers: xxxx xxxxxx from President Mwai Kibaki‘s Party of National Unity, Sally Kosgei, Henry Kosgey, William Ruto, Najib Balala and the late Kipkalya Kones from Prime Minister Raila Odinga‘s Orange Democratic Movement. It also included allegations against a bishop and several preachers, Christian and Muslim, for involvement in the violence. List of Alleged Perpetrators.

To substantiate its ‘list of perpetrators’, which includes 20 MPs, the KNCHR report goes into some detail about political meetings leading up to the election crisis and some held once the violence had started. It argues forcefully that at least part of the violence was well organised prior to the election.
For example, it reports that Agriculture Minister William Ruto (MP for Eldoret North) held a meeting in August 2007 with other senior ODM leaders in Kipkelion near Kericho which included the late Lorna Laboso (MP for Sotik), the late Kipkalya Kones (MP for Bomet and a Minister) and Franklin Bett (MP for Bureti). At this meeting, the report states the attendees resolved to carry out mass evictions of non-Kalenjins from their homes in the Rift Valley, particularly the Kikuyu and Abagusii.

In a separate section, the report names former High Commissioner to London and now Minister of Higher Education Sally Kosgei as ‘planning, inciting and financing’ the violence in the Rift Valley. It also accuses Tourism Minister Najib Balala of inciting and paying youths Ksh500 (US$7.37) each to cause violence.

The Commission Chairwoman, Florence Simbiri-Jaoko, who replaced Maina Kiai at the end of July, said the full report listed five ministers, five religious leaders, eight senior provincial administrators and 13 others. She would pass its findings to the government’s own probe, the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence, which is headed by Justice Philip Waki and which is partly funded by the United Nations, she added. She will call for the prosecution of the named officials and others implicated in the events in five of Kenya’s eight provinces (Rift, Nyanza, Western, Coast and Central) and in Nairobi.

Now politicians and journalists are taking aim at the KNCHR’s report. Nairobi’s Daily Nation claims that an annexe with the full list of names was removed at the last minute and suggests that the names of Odinga’s allies were removed but those of Kibaki’s stayed. KNCHR officials deny any such doctoring.

It is true that in the version of the report made public, the Odinga supporters named – with the exception of a former lieutenant of ex-President Daniel arap Moi, William Ole Ntimama – are almost all minor political and business players who would have drawn finance and support from more senior figures. Many say that powerful Kikuyu business and political interests financed the pro-Kibaki gangs in Nairobi’s slums but the report says nothing about the financiers of the anti-Kikuyu gangs.

Three chapters of the report are devoted to the worst hit South, North, and Central parts of the Rift Valley. They detail atrocities such as the burning alive of Kikuyu people in a church in Kiambaa in Eldoret, the forcible circumcision of Luo men who then bled to death, murders and lynchings by gangs in various parts of the country and in Nairobi’s slums, and hundreds of rapes.

The report criticises the ‘negative ethnicity’ of FM radio stations and of members of parliament at pre-election rallies. In the Rift, the term kuondoa madoadoa (‘remove the spot’) incited constituents to get rid of Kikuyu. Kihii (‘uncircumcised man’ in Kikuyu) was used to berate uncircumcised Luo.
Information was collected over four months in 136 constituencies from 1,102 deponents, including 46 senior policemen, 40 provincial administrators, 33 councillors and ten MPs. The detail, numbers and naming of at least some names is a breakthrough. It is unclear whether the individuals interviewed will testify, given the police’s difficulty in obtaining evidence, or whether the information will stand up in court.

The KNCHR asks the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to open investigations on Kenya, claiming crimes against humanity were committed as part of a planned policy, and to determine ‘who bears the greatest responsibility’.

The KNCHR details violence against Kikuyu and upcountry groups in the Rift and elsewhere, and retaliatory violence against Luo, Kalenjin and people of other non-Kikuyu ethnic groups, which led to 7,500 ‘episodes of violence’, numerous rapes, and the destruction of property. It claims that this was premeditated, highly organised and financed by key politicians, businessmen, community leaders, civil servants and many teachers.

The former District Commissioner of Uasin Gishu in the Rift, Bernard Kinyua, has told the Waki Commission that he and others received no reports that youths were being trained and said the violence there was spontaneous. Hassan Noor Hassan, Provincial Commissioner of the Rift Valley, also insisted to the Waki Commission that the violence was spontaneous and that reports of oath-taking had been inferred incorrectly from circumcision ceremonies taking place at the time.
Three District Commissioners from the North Rift, Stephan Ikua (Koibatek), Mabeya Mogaka (formerly of Nandi North) and Aden Parake (Kipkelion), also told the Waki Commission that the violence was spontaneous. In the 1990s, the Akiwumi Commission’s investigation into tribal clashes accused government administrators of being untruthful and attempting cover-ups.

The report argues that the police and security agencies adopted a shoot-to-kill policy, mainly in Kisumu and parts of Nairobi. Police officers from Kisumu and Homa Bay in Nyanza (Edward Mwamburi and Simon Kiragu) told the Waki Commission that they were ordered to use live rounds.

The KNCHR chastises the government for failing to act on warnings from the National Security Intelligence Service. Earlier, the Director of that service, Brigadier Michael Gichangi, had testified to the Waki Commission that it had information forecasting violence before the elections, including reports of oathing and the names of gang sponsors.

The report describes positive actions to quell violence by police and other agencies, acknowledging that their task was enormous and sometimes overwhelming. It also describes cases where police and others assisted individuals from their own groups and failed to protect other communities. Some clergy did likewise, although in Narok and Mombassa, elders, religious leaders and police persuaded local youths to desist from violence.

The report asked the Attorney General or the police to investigate those listed in its unpublished Annex 1, while noting that the list is not comprehensive. It also calls for an investigation of the security forces and for special courts in the ‘theatres of violence’. Its other recommendations include the enactment of legislation on ‘hate speech’, provision for internally displaced people and human rights education for nation-building.

August 5, 2008

Martha Karua

Martha Karua

When Martha Karua announced in late 2007 that she would be one of the debutantes for the 2012 presidential polls, most of us ignored her.Enter 2008, she has repeatedly reiterated this and proceeded to underpin it with concrete political action. She is now interim chair of NARC-K, the PNU partner boasting the highest number of members in the tenth Parliament. When she therefore asserts that she is no longer interested in PNU unity and wishes to strengthen her party in preparation for 2012, only non-serious political strategists can afford to take her lightly.

Ms Karua is the embodiment of political suave. No one quite understands how she appeared on the political scene. She stands on no historical political legacy akin to Mr Uhuru Kenyatta, Mr Musalia Mudavadi or Mr Raila Odinga, nor was she chaperoned into politics by any national or regional kingpins as was Mr Kalonzo Musyoka. Neither was she born into financial plenty to help her “buy” her way into parliament as many others have had to. And, in the many years she has served from the backbench of parliament and later the front bench as cabinet minister, she has not been embroiled in financial improprieties.

Her tenure as cabinet minister has also been colourful. Those in the Water ministry will tell you that she left a legacy that endures. She is credited with a reform model that has now become a benchmark for reforms in other sectors. And, she was strong and no-nonsense when she served there. Those in the Justice ministry will have stories to tell about her tireless style. She works indefatigably. That’s good for policy formulation and driving.

Raw courage

Her raw courage amazes. Recall when she stoically walked out in broad daylight, cameras zooming,  on former president Moi in Kerugoya stadium, that she had been denied a chance to address her people?
Why then would anyone be surprised that she, today, can easily stand her ground against President Kibaki on this small matter of PNU unity? That’s Martha for us.That’s why I think it would be political folly to disregard her current drive for presidential office. Here’s a Kenyan with an unblemished record of public service, occupies a key cabinet office, is leader of a growing political party, has courage and a doubtless clarity of mind.
Clearly, she has come from afar to occupy ground earlier reserved for only the likes of Mr Uhuru and Mr Saitoti in taking the mantle from President Kibaki.

July 17, 2008

Kenyan Cabinet

A power-sharing agreement here that brought peace in the wake of controversial elections in December that sparked political violence that killed at least 1,500 people, has been hailed as a model by the African Union for countries like Zimbabwe struggling to deal with the aftermath of a disputed vote. In February, President Mwai Kibaki named opposition leader Raila Odinga to the newly created post of prime minister. Kibaki and Odinga – the latter had accused the incumbent president of rigging the election – then agreed to parcel out top government posts among their allies and expand the Cabinet from 34 ministries to 41 to better represent Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups.At the time, it seemed diplomacy had worked, damping a blazing political rivalry with a handshake and a smile.

Violence soon ended. But five months later, many analysts say little has been done to remedy the conditions of impunity and corruption at the heart of Kenya’s political crisis. Among the country’s new ministers are men accused of inciting election violence and being key players in corruption scandals that have swindled taxpayers of more than $1 billion since the 1990s, according to Kroll Inc., an international risk-assessment firm. And a look at this year’s national budget suggests that the new parliament has returned to business as usual, these same analysts say.

“The script remains the same,” said Barach Muluka, a political commentator in the capital, Nairobi. “The cast is largely the same. A few players have come on board but everything is largely the same.”Not far from the site in the small village of Kiambaa where Kalenjin tribal fighters set a church alight, burning more than 30 Kikuyus alive in January, Kalenjin elders pointed to the man who they say could have stopped the violence.

“If William Ruto says stop, it will stop,” the elders told Human Rights Watch. Ruto, who denies involvement in ethnic violence, is the new minister of agriculture.In February, police investigated William ole Ntimama, the new minister of national heritage, after finding gasoline canisters in his vehicle in the town of Narok. Members of his Masai ethnic group had killed and raped Kikuyu residents, before burning their homes to the ground. Ntimama denies the allegations. “This is a warlord Cabinet,” said Muluka. “The citizens, the voters, are gun fodder. Once the warlords get what they want, the guns fall silent.”

To be sure, there are signs that Kenya is returning to normal. In the lakeside town of Naivasha, safari vehicles are filled with foreign tourists gawking at hippos and drinking tea at lakeside estates that were once the stomping grounds of Kenya’s colonial class. Across the road, sagging white tents, and trampled savannah grass are reminders of a displacement camp for thousands of refugees who had fled election violence. Chairs still cluster around a tin-roof building where the Kenya Red Cross handed out food and medicines. Today, only a few hundred people remain, fearful of going home and still waiting for the $158 government stipend for resettlement. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights estimates that there are 190,000 displaced people still living in camps across Kenya.

But there are signs that Kenya is heading for another political calamity.

Kenya has requested $1.1 billion from international donors to avert a looming food crisis caused by rising prices, and just 15 percent of the national budget has been allocated for development programs, according to the Mars Group, a Kenyan anti-corruption watchdog organization. Moreover, the newly created Cabinet positions will cost at least $800 million in office space, staff, bodyguards and state-issued luxury cars, more than a tenth of the national budget. Another $30 million, nearly the amount of the entire education budget, has been set aside for water and power utilities at the presidential estate. And more than $100 million has been allocated for debt payments on so-called ghost projects, including $70 million for a naval ship that has never been delivered and $100 million for a nonexistent fertilizer company, according to the Mars Group.

Why? Parliament has yet to debate the budget. Instead, lawmakers have spent much of their time fighting a plan to tax their annual salaries of $160,000. In contrast, a U.S. senator earns $169,300. “If they dillydally, and invoke political dishonesty as we have seen in the past – take advantage of power to reintroduce tribalism, corruption, and benefit a nucleus of friends – then there is a likelihood that this will not be a lasting peace,” said Omar Hassan, a commissioner with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. “The portrayal that Kenya was a unified, dignified, peaceful country, that same myth will be challenged and deconstructed a second time.”

Cabinet ministers under a cloud

Kenya’s new coalition government includes seven new ministries. Several Cabinet ministers, however, are believed to be behind past corruption scandals and post-election violence. They include:– William Ruto, minister of agriculture: Kenya’s National Commission on Human Rights accuses him of threatening Kikuyu farmers who had settled on Kalenjin lands. Both militiamen and refugees displaced by the conflict say he incited violence. Ruto denies the allegations.– William ole Ntimama, minister of national heritage: A Masai leader, he has been accused of inciting violence against Kikuyu farmers in the Rift Valley. He denies the allegations.– Amos Kimunya, minister of finance: Just this month, he announced his resignation after parliament gave him a vote of no-confidence. Kimunya is believed to have participated in the secret sale of a government-owned luxury hotel to a Libyan investment group for less than half its value.– John Michuki, acting minister of finance: As the former minister for internal security, Michuki ordered raids on a Nairobi newspaper that had written extensively about government corruption and the presidents family affairs.

July 17, 2008

Grand Hoax running Kenya

Prime Minister Raila Odinga and Justice Minister Martha Karua on Wednesday tore into the anti-corruption policy of the very Government they serve.By the virtue of their positions, the statements only added to the confusion that has characterized the war on corruption.As Prime Minister, Raila is charged with supervising and coordinating functions of Government, which has been the breeding ground for corruption. On her part, Karua is the custodian of the Justice machinery. In principle, the two should serve as the fulcrum around which the battle must be fought.
On his part, Raila appeared to plead lack of political will, but Karua attacked the Executive, accusing it of failing to live up to its promises.

And by calling for the return of celebrated anti-corruption czar John Githongo, who fled the country in 2005 amid claims that his life was in danger, Raila appeared to openly express dissatisfaction with the individuals and institutions charged with the task. Karua challenged the Grand Coalition to take the unique opportunity and bi-partisan approach and suggest policy and legal options to rid Kenya of corruption once and for all.“So long as we have pending cases of old corruption arising from transactions of Goldenberg, Anglo-Leasing and the Ndung’u Report, we cannot clear the backlog. The perception will be that the Government is still tolerating corruption,” Karua noted.

However, Raila and Karua admitted that the Government faced legal and policy hurdles in the fight against corruption.“While the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission tries to freeze assets acquired corruptly in foreign jurisdictions, our own courts have issued injunctions against the same,” Raila said.
Backing Karua’s stand on unfinished business of old corruption, Raila said it was embarrassing to see people named in corruption cases reports of Public Accounts Committee and Public Investments Committee of Parliament demonstrating and accusing others of the vice.

July 11, 2008

Raila Odinga is a disgrace to the African continent

By Susan Chipanga

MARK Twain, an acclaimed American author wrote: “It is better to keep your mouth closed and let people think you are a fool than to open it and remove all doubt”.

This timeless quote was brought to mind after intolerable criticism of Zimbabwe by Raila Odinga, Prime Minister of the Kenyan Government of National Unity whose ticket to power was signed by the blood of innocent people. Odinga’s moral right to condemn Zimbabwean elections is overshadowed by his coming into office as a result of the death of 1 500 people and the displacement of over 600 000 people.

On December 30, 2007 the chairman of the Kenyan election commission declared Odinga’s opponent, incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, the winner by a margin of about 230 000 votes. Raila challenged the results alleging fraud by the commission, but refused an election petition before the courts and urged protests, which plunged the country into one of the brutal and bloody post-election violence ever to be witnessed in recent history. Shamefacedly, the poor fellow has been blabbering on about Zimbabwe’s elections, violence, peacekeepers and for the country to be barred from regional bodies; a case some may attribute to being overwhelmed by the glare of the media after being in political obscurity for so long. Consequently, the whole of Africa and the world are regaled by the antics of a witless and hypocritical African politician whose propensity to expose himself unearths his want of tact and maturity in African politics.

Some who are not so harsh in their criticism of Odinga’s unwarranted utterances on Zimbabwe are easy to forgive him as he is a product of incarcerations, flights into exile and betrayal by erstwhile political allies which undoubtedly has made him a bitter man mad at the whole of Africa for not intervening on his behalf. Odinga, as a result, has made himself a champion of opposition politics in Africa after his backdoor entry to leadership in Kenya making him an emperor without clothes after Kenya’s recent history which someone said reads like a Shakespearian tale; full of dramatic intrigue, intricate conspiracies and king making plots.

Odinga’s unwarranted criticism of Zimbabwe might be borne from a need to outshine Mwai Kibaki, the Kenyan president who trounced him in the December election. But, Zimbabwe cannot bear the brunt of his inferiority complex in a bid to gain recognition in African politics. Someone should advise Odinga that the route he has taken is a dead end and neither is it going to absolve him of the blood that is on his hands as rightly pointed by the presidential spokesperson, George Charamba, during the recent African Union Summit in Egypt.

Maybe Odinga’s weakness is more to do with not acquainting himself with African history. He should start to appreciate that more is at stake than meets the eye in the Zimbabwean situation. If the sentiments he echoed during his inauguration are anything to go by, then he is in for a rude awakening in his quest to liberate Kenyans from neo-colonialism.

When Odinga was sworn in as Prime Minister of Kenya on April 18 2008, he told the gathering that “we will ensure that power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of many, not the few”. Robert Mugabe whom he is now alleging is a dictator was once the darling of the West until he decided to empower his people by distributing land, which was in the hands of a few whites to the majority of the landless blacks Kenya, like all other African countries, is no exception. It would want to address these historical imbalances and some have alluded that the chaos that Kenya witnessed is the result of historic injustices including land tenure systems and the unequal sharing of resources between the country’s more than 40 ethnic groups.

Other African leaders know that addressing the injustices born out of colonialism is at the core of all African problems and that sooner or later, these issues have to be addressed by each member country. The decisions made by African leaders at the AU summit, that is, wanting Africans to solve their own problems is born out of a realisation that abandoning Zimbabwe at this critical stage will set a bad precedent.



Some delusional African politicians like Odinga might not understand that sticking together with Zimbabwe is also for their future well-being. That, Mr Odinga, is the definition of Pan Africanism. It is not about calling yourself a Pan Africanist when your deeds are devoid of “ubuntu” as you were able to countenance the beheading, skinning, raping, murdering and torturing of innocent people for your own political gain.I am no religious fanatic but I do believe the good book offers sound advice in the case of looking at a straw in another’s eye whilst not considering the rafter in your own eye. It is evident Odinga is singing for the few morsels that the United States is dropping on his lap whilst mortgaging Kenya in the process. Reports indicate that the US government is negotiating base access agreements with the government of Kenya that will allow American troops to use military facilities when the United States wants to deploy its own army in Africa. So at the right intervals Odinga has to make the right noises on Zimbabwe so as to appease his benefactors. Shame on you Odinga!

Odinga is a disgrace to the continent, which has produced notable statesmen like Nelson Mandela who spent all his life fighting for the liberation of his people and Robert Mugabe who is fighting for the total emancipation of his people. What has Odinga to show for himself, except bloody hands, which no doubt soiled his reputation of ever being regarded as a statesman. Instead of being fixated with what is happening in Zimbabwe, Odinga should be concerned with healing his own country where thousands still remain displaced, traumatised and reluctant to return to the their former homes because the horrors they witnessed are forever etched in their minds. Odinga will remain an overly ambitious politician who would stop at nothing to achieve his political ends. He should keep his tainted hands off Zimbabwe.

BREAKING NEWS: China and Russia Veto Zim Sanctions.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEMvABKDaSk%5D

July 2, 2008

The ‘New’ Kenya: A return to the normal state of denial

Six months after post election clashes brought this country to its knees, life in Kenya appears back to normal — for better and for worse.

Ethnic fighting that killed more than 1,000 people has subsided. Political enemies are working together in a coalition government. Kenyans have returned to work and school “We’re slipping back into trivia while the central issues are not being addressed,” said Richard Leakey, chairman of the Kenya branch of Transparency International, a government watchdog group. “We have not gone very far in addressing the fundamental problems. The government isn’t showing any realism.”A fragile coalition government, cobbled together by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has inspired little confidence. The bloated 93-member Cabinet is the most expensive in Kenyan history, and critics accuse parliament members of being more concerned with preserving their tax-free $10,000-a-month pay packages than the plight of their constituents.

Frosty ties

Relations between President Mwai Kibaki and his rival, Prime Minister Raila Odinga, are sometimes so frosty that their security guards nearly came to blows at a government rally in June. Meanwhile, Odinga and the vice president are fighting over which man comes second to Kibaki in the pecking order, resulting in tiffs over who should speak first in public and whose motorcade gets right of way.Hopes that the painful clashes might usher in overdue reforms and encourage Kenyans to tackle long-standing historical grievances and tribal tensions are fading.

“It would seem, then, that these politicians had finally got what they wanted: power, or, to be precise, a share of it,” read a recent front-page editorial in the Standard newspaper. “Other matters were quickly relegated to the bottom of their priorities agenda.”Even the controversial electoral commission, which was widely criticized by local and international observers for failing to prevent vote fraud, remains intact and recently oversaw another round of polling for parliament members.The government’s first test was coping with an estimated 350,000 displaced people living in squalid camps after postelection violence drove them from their homes. Riots engulfed much of the country after the electoral commission, handpicked by Kibaki, ignored evidence of tallying fraud after the election and hastily declared him the victor. Violence quickly turned into ethnic warfare as Kenya’s tribes vented long-standing frustrations over competition for land, jobs and political power. Entire villages were burned to the ground.

In May, the government announced a campaign to resettle Kenyans, sometimes by force, in their villages. Government officials say nearly 200,000 people returned home.But in reality, very few have returned to the homes they fled, aid workers say. Most have simply shifted to new, smaller camps, moved in with relatives, returned to ancestral homelands or are squatting on empty land or church grounds.”It wasn’t really a resettlement — it was just a transfer,” said Charles Kariuki, who leads a group of displaced people in central Kenya.Critics say the government not only failed to provide the promised monetary compensation to help victims rebuild homes, but it also ignored the most crucial component: reconciliation. Legislation to create a national reconciliation commission is tied up in parliament.

As a result, many displaced people say they remain too afraid or too angry to go home.Virginia Wangari, 62, a divorced mother of eight, said she was persuaded by government officials to leave a displacement camp in May and return to her Rift Valley village. She said she was promised tents, food and other supplies, and told that local officials would be waiting to welcome her.Instead, she and other returnees found no one to greet them and spent their first night on a bus by the side of the road. In the morning, local officials told her she was on her own, suggesting that she pitch a tent on the charred remains of her house.She quickly learned that going home was not an option. The same rival tribe members who had chased her away six months earlier were attacking and raping women who attempted to return. Not far away, returnees were greeted with threatening leaflets, making it clear they were not welcome.

“I’m not going to take my neck to the butcher,” Wangari said. “If I went home now, I’d be killed.” She returned to the displacement camp.Humanitarian aid experts say the government needs to lay the groundwork for resettlement by bringing tribes together to vent their frustrations and forgive one another.”You have to have reconciliation before resettlement,” said Daniel Were, a peace activist in the city of Eldoret. “The government wants to be seen as doing something, but they are only doing part of the job.”U.S. Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger expressed optimism that the new government would produce results in coming months, saying Kibaki and Odinga are committed to the process.”People need to keep their eye on the president and prime minister, and listen to what they are saying,” Ranneberger said. “They realize they need each other to fulfill their agendas.”But others say Kenya’s leaders may be reluctant to tackle the most controversial issues, such as land reform and constitutional review, because they worry that a debate could rekindle tensions, possibly leading to a collapse of the coalition or renewed fighting.

Perils for politicians

Many politicians now serving in top posts also may find themselves implicated in investigations of corruption, election fraud and post-election violence, creating another disincentive, experts said.Most of the people in this government are the product of 40 years of corruption, violence and impunity,” said Ben Rawlence, a Kenya researcher for Human Rights Watch.“They are all involved. The coalition government itself is what needs to be brought to book.”

He expressed pessimism that government officials would push for reforms or prosecutions that might curtail their powers, hit their pocketbooks or implicate their supporters.Odinga, for example, recently called for amnesty for jailed supporters accused of participating in riots. Kibaki is insisting that they be tried in court.”If this is the face of the ‘new’ Kenya,” Rawlence said, “it’s worrying.”

June 24, 2008

Uncle Bob:Zimbabwe

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhme6ZEgj7A%5D

“Was it not enough punishment and suffering in history that we were uprooted and made helpless slaves not only in new colonial outposts but also domestically.”

“We don’t mind having sanctions banning us from Europe. We are not Europeans.”

“We have said we will never collapse, never ever. We may have our droughts, our poverty, but as a people we shall never collapse, never ever.”

“The voice of The United States and the voice of the British can’t decide who shall rule in Zimbabwe, who shall rule in Africa, who shall rule in Asia, who shall rule in Venezuela, who shall rule in Iran, who shall rule in Iraq.”

Robert G. Mugabe (Uncle Bob)

May 21, 2008

Rift Valley Amnesty:Kibaki has already rewarded the criminals

raila Kenya’s newly formed coalition government is divided over how to deal with thousands of people arrested in connection with the post-election violence which was sparked by the country’s disputed presidential poll. Divisions have emerged among ministers allied to Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Party (ODM) and President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) over the issue of amnesty.

    Ministers in the premier’s party are calling for amnesty, an appeal rejected by their counterparts in the president’s party. “ODM called for protests and PNU ordered police to shoot at the youths to quell the protests. The police were as guilty as anyone,” said Agriculture Minister William Ruto.

    ”This is a matter that decides whether our country is under the rule of law or the rule of the jungle. There is due process to be followed before the youths are released,” said Justice Minister Martha Karua.Thousands of people are still being held by the police in connection with violence in December and January that killed over 1,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Many of those arrested were from the Kalenjin ethnic group in the Rift Valley or from the western city of Kisumu, who were supporters of opposition leader Raila Odinga, now the prime minister.

 Several of the lawmakers from these areas are calling for amnesty for those being held, a call that was echoed by the premier during his visit to the Rift Valley.  Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula said on Wednesday the issue whether to forgive those who committed crimes after the Dec.27 elections will be discussed in the cabinet on Thursday.  And his Information counterpart Samuel Porghisio downplayed rifts among ministers over the handling of the post-election violence suspects.  ”What we have witnessed is individual opinion of some MPs. Amnesty was never an issue of agreement or disagreement during the(Kofi) Annan-led talks,” he said. Energy Assistant Minister Charles Keter said most of those arrested were engaged in political protests against what they perceived as a stolen election. “We (MPs) are their products. This is the time we should pardon each other; we will not stop agitating for their release,” said Keter. “These people were fighting for their rights. I feel that if we have a coalition government which is trying to reconcile Kenyans, they should be given amnesty,” he said.

 But key figures in President Kibaki’s party have rejected calls for amnesty, saying those responsible for serious crimes should be brought to justice.”Thorough investigations should be conducted and those who killed should be charged with murder. Those who set houses ablaze should face arson charges,” said Dick Wathika, an assistant minister for public works. Those who support amnesty argue that the arrests inexplicably targeted communities supporting Odinga, while supporters of the president who committed crimes in towns like Naivasha and Nakuru received less attention from the police. “We have people who were murdered in Naivasha. The people who murdered them were seen by the police and the police never arrested a single one of them. Human heads were used to block roads in Naivasha and the police saw it and they never arrested a single person holding a human head,” said Prof. Ayiecho Olweny, education assistant minister.  Supporters of amnesty also argue that most of those arrested are young people who likely had little role in organizing crimes. Some members of the president’s party including human rights officials agree.

    ”These are basically youth who are used by other people, so my thinking is that we need to have a structured amnesty program, nota blanket amnesty,” said Lee Kinjanjui, a legislator.

    Hassan Omar Hassan of the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights said the Amnesty debate has become politicized.  ”What is happening from both sides is that the debate has taken an ethnic dimension, it has taken a partisan position, it has taken grounding within the framework of personalities,” he said. “We cannot politicize matters of great national importance to that point. And I think it will not do any Kenyan any good if that were the trend this discussion were to take.” As divisions persist, analysts said the fate of the post-election violence suspects remain in the hands of the cabinet which is expected to discuss the issue by the end of the day.

May 16, 2008

Kenya: frustrations are now boiling up into ethnic territorial claims

Kenya’s recent history has been dotted with several intense episodes of land-ownership conflict, starting in the early 1950s with the bloody repression of the Mau Mau movement by the British colonial power. This conflict caused 11 000 deaths among the rebels and also prompted the first regrouping of agricultural lands in Kenya. Access to land in this former European colony is still to this day a particularly hotly disputed issue.

The colonial heritage also found expression in an administrative tradition where territorial control was paramount of all priorities. Stemming from this, interior boundaries defined exclusive territories, both in the form of nature reserves (forest, national parks) and “ethnic reserves”, which often took on the aspect of administrative bodies. The result was a sectorization which certain repercussions on the distribution of the different communities which populate the country. This situation has become a source of inter-ethnic tension. And it is particularly portentous in the Chebyuk area of the Mount Elgon district where an IRD researcher has been conducting a long-term study on the origins of the conflict over access to arable land which opposes the Kalenjin language communities (Sabaots, Ndorobos and Soy), and whose emergence is closely linked to identity affirmation.

The fertile, well watered Chebyuk region on the southern slopes of Mount Elgon, about 2000 m high, was until 2006 home of a population of 35 000 over a 10 km2 surface area. Following primary forest clearance which had begun in the 1970s, crops of maize, cabbage, onion and potatoes, for export to Kenya’s large towns and cities, developed steadily. Since that time, the geographic area has represented an agricultural front for families coming mainly from the Sabaot community, settled on either side of the frontier between Kenya and Uganda. To meet people’s demand for farming plots, in the 1970s a committee of elders, co-opted by government authorities, organized a first land distribution operation. However, from the mid 1980s, rivalries rose up over ownership of this expanse of land.

Pressure from the Sabaot community led to the settlement and clearance of a more extensive zone than the legally delimited area. In 1989, complaints about the misappropriation of these land allocations prompted a government decision to reorganize the attribution of the farming plots. It was a time when tensions came to a head and houses were burned down. Tensions broke out with rival land claims which were arbitrated by a politico-administrative class which persisted in maintaining a a system of partiality.

The 1989 land reform therefore provided for the redistribution of all land in the localities of Emia and Chebyuk. It was organized in three phases, each corresponding to a particular area of Chebyuk: the lists of beneficiaries of phases 1 and 2 were finalized in 2004; the one for phase 3 was made official in 2006, marking the end of what was a 30-year-long land redistribution programme (see Map). It was subsequent to this final reorganization that the conflict rose to the surface, ending in a form of spatial segregation that rent asunder the apparent unity of the Sabaot community. Towards the end of 2006, clashes between the Sabaot and Ndorobos, a new ethnic identity that had gradually emerged from among those of the Sabaot group who had been cast aside, resulted in the displacement of 60 000 people and the death of 200 others. The region’s inhabitants assimilated with the Ndorobos then took refuge on the high moorland expanses of Chepkitale and in the forest reserve area at the boundary of the Trans Nzoia district. Others, assimilated with the Soy, went over to the plains not far from the Ugandan border (Cheptais), the main town of the district (Kapsokwony) or the neighbouring district of Trans Nzoia.

More recently, the violent stresses associated with the December 2007 elections, expressed locally by rival factions’ taking up of arms, played a role in the magnifying the conflict. Those long battles for land nevertheless find their origin more in the history of State schemes for regulating access to land ownership, rooted in practices of political favouritism and authoritarian methods employed to implement land redistribution operations. Land appropriation battles in the Mount Elgon region stem in the end from repeated episodes of land allocations and evictions which gave rise to frustrations that are now boiling up into ethnic territorial claims

April 23, 2008

Rift Valley & KenyaToday

The highest law of the land, the Constitution of Kenya, is explicit on the issue of property ownership by any Kenyan anywhere in the country.This was deliberate because the right to property was one of the sticking points during the Lancaster conferences at the dawn of Independence.The Constitution that was agreed on was explicit that no property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired from any Kenyan anywhere.

The import of that is that even if a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is set up, it is doubtful if its mandate will be to extinguish the right to property in the name of correcting historical injustices.The saddest thing about the land situation in Kenya is that the largest culprits actually are amongst some of our political elite and are the same ones who manipulate the peasantry to unleash terror on perceived ‘foreigners’ amongst them.

That a section of Rift Valley Members of Parliament, piqued after failing to clinch Cabinet posts, are actually using the internally displaced people in Rift Valley as a bargaining tool with the government, is not only morally unacceptable, but also highly alarming and extremely myopic.One of the reasons why Kenya is facing a looming food shortage is that thousands of farmers cannot till their land as they are afraid of going back to their farms after being chased away due to the outcome of the just concluded election.It is therefore very irresponsible for political leaders to use these people as political bait to further their personal ambitions. That is the height of sadism.

But more so, this is a grim pointer to the levels that our politicians have gone to achieve their aims and what precedent such actions portend for the future.It is clearly emerging that a new style of political ransom is slowly taking root in Kenya, where disgruntled politicians use all means at their disposal, legal or illegal, to score political goals.This is a bad precedent for Kenya. This time round, the Government should not negotiate with the disgruntled MP’s who want their fellow country men to live in sub-human conditions. The supreme law of the land is clear and it should be followed to the letter.

The President and the Prime Minister should put their feet down and refuse to be held hostage by a group of disgruntled politicians and move swiftly to ensure that the internally displaced are quickly and securely resettled.Similarly, any politician who is found to be inciting the population to chase away and make it hard for the internally displaced from settling down, should face the full wrath of the law without mercy. The culture of political impunity should be brought to an end in Kenya and no one should be allowed to hold a group of people hostage like this.

We all understand the genesis of the land inequity in Kenya and we cannot simply wake up one day and seek to undo history. The colonial notoriety of land acquisition and the subsequent land redistribution mess under both Kenyatta and Moi regimes will not be tackled by torching houses, chasing and killing innocent people.

Finally, it makes sense for the Government to quickly step in and assist in compensating Kenyans who were affected by the political turmoil that beset this country.These were Kenyans who were paying taxes on the belief that the Government would do its part and ensure their property is secure but the Government has failed to fulfil its end of the bargain and should thus step forward and compensate its tax payers.That is the way forward.

April 8, 2008

Democracy Do we care?

March 27, 2008

Not willing to give up on tribe

I am not yet willing to give up on the concept of tribe. I am unwilling to grant that colonizers were right in their claims that tribe was a limited concept that had no place in the modern world. I am unwilling to accept their definitions that my history and heritage are small and uninteresting, lacking in depth and complexity, beauty and joy.

I am not yet willing to give up on the concept of tribe.

Tribe lets my friend say, “my name means one born at night,” and my other friend to say, “I belong to the people who shape metal,” and yet another friend to say, “I bring rain in the dry seasons.” Tribe marks the changing of generations, Maina to Irungu, Kamau to Peter.

Tribe celebrates how we have lived, how we have loved, how we have suffered, how we have mourned. We are the descendants of Gatego, the generation riddled with syphilis and Ngige, the generation decimated by locusts. To say these names is to claim that our stories are not yet done. We are not yet done. We are here.

I am unwilling to relinquish tribe.

To say tribe is to recognize the diversity of who we are. To say that women from that ridge discipline their men. Men from that hill are bowlegged. Children from that place run like the wind. To say that people from that place make the best ũcũrũ (porridge), from that other place the best mũratina (an alcoholic drink), from that other place the best mũtura (a dish made from stuffed animal intestines).

To say tribe is to say people from that place talk fast, they sing their language. And people from that other place are tall. And people from that other place are dark. And people from that place like the dark taste of burnt beans. And people from that place like the iron-rich veins of green weeds.

I am unwilling to relinquish tribe.

There’s too much left to discover, too much left to explore, too much potential to be realized. The past remains an untapped ore, myth, a rich vein, the present a fertile, fallow field. Songs remain to be sung, stories written, dramas acted.

We have much creating to do.

Tribe is not simply an inheritance, but untapped potential. It is the material we can work on, work with, transform and translate.

For me, tribe is Wamũyũ, Gikuyu’s tenth daughter, mother of an illegitimate child, founder of a hospitable clan. Wamũyũ, who embodies the mystery, wonder and potential of intimate hospitality. Wamũyũ, whose unnamed and unnameable lover fractures any sense of insularity, Wamũyũ, whose intimate welcome illustrates the best of tribal hospitality, tribal love, tribal openness.

For me, tribe is Wangũ wa Makeri, the leader who dared to dance nude in the moonlight. Wangũ, who let the moon’s rays caress her, her people’s eyes embrace her. Wangũ, who understood that leadership meant being vulnerable and taking risks that might compromise her leadership.

Against all logic, against all sense, I am in love with the concept of tribe.

It is, like all love, fraught with complications and ambivalence. At times I want to scream at what seem to be the limitations of tribal identification, the ways I am called upon to perform tribe: to sing, dance, or act in a certain way. I chafe at the constrictions that ask me to speak my language to gain certain favours. I worry that my positions are taken for granted, that my identity may be said to dictate my politics.

I am often seduced by the invitation to identify myself as national, international, or cosmopolitan. I am tempted by the idea that I can and should transcend tribe. I am compelled by the idea that I would be a better person if my allegiances were less local, less idiosyncratic, less wedded to nine clans that face Mount Kenya. But I believe in this love.

I believe in its potential. I want to see where it leads.


February 23, 2008

Maina Kiai needs to be honest – Billow Khalid

While on US tour, Mr Maina Kiai, the chairman of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, and Ms Muthoni Wanyeki asked their American hosts to freeze all military financial assistance to Kenya.They wrote in the Washington Post that “some of the security forces benefiting from this aid and equipment have been killing Kenyan civilians with impunity.There is no doubt that the country has been experiencing ferocious eruptions of violence since December 30, 2007.

The four words, happy, home, peace and prosperity are heavenly music to the ears of traumatised and displaced Kenyans.The Kenya Army has played and will for sure continue to play its rightful role by clearing highways of marauding gangs, securing the national economic arteries,maina kiai escorting public transports, and providing medical services.While some 57 brave police officers have died in the violence in the line of public service, I have not heard of a single civilian killed by the military during these public unrest.What got me worried, however, are the serious, unsubstantiated aspersions on the integrity of our Armed Forces coming, as it were, from a highly placed and a jurist of Mr Kiai’s status.

To begin with, the Kenyan qualifying to be a member of the country’s military takes an oath to uphold the Constitution of the Republic and defend the country against all enemies, to bear true allegiance and to discharge well and faithfully, the duties of office.Most of them attend to their duties with fidelity, valour and patriotism. Our security personnel operate under difficult and risky environment.

They are like all public officers, the glue holding the country together.Without their exemplary sense of fidelity, the country could not have endured in its present form since the turbulent times of the 60s.The least the military personnel expect are encouragement, appreciation and understanding of their heroic contributions, not unjustified condemnation for crimes they have not committed.

BILLOW KHALID,
Wajir.

http://billowkhalid.blogspot.com/


February 23, 2008

Shocking BBC interview of Kalenjin Church Burners and Jackson Kibor

February 9, 2008

Who Are the Kikuyu? The Jews of Kenya

House of Mumbi

House of Mumbi

CENTRAL PROVINCE, Kenya—On the hillsides, tea is still being picked; in the valleys, women still weed rows of beans, feet stained ocher by the soil; and in downtown Nyeri, the matatu taxi vans still honk by custom. The only immediate hint that something is amiss is to be found on the veranda of the Outspan Hotel. Despite boasting one of Africa’s most stunning views—Mount Kenya stretches serenely on the far side of the plains—the Outspan is strangely quiet these days; most of its tourists have fled.

If Kenya is ablaze, it’s almost possible to miss that fact in Central Province. A few hours’ drive west, machete-wielding youths blockade roads, shops have been looted, and refugee camps spring up like mushrooms. At first glance, the country’s most serious crisis since independence has barely dented the banal routines of daily life.There’s a reason for this. Central Province is the home of President Mwai Kibaki—his Othaya constituency lies just south of Nyeri. While his Kikuyu kinsmen have been burned alive and lynched across the rest of Kenya, punished for his suspected rigging of the December elections, only a madman would dare lift a hand to a Kikuyu on his home turf.

But that doesn’t allay a crawling sense of unease. The relationship between the Kikuyu and the rest of Kenya has been warped, residents sense, possibly beyond repair. Nyeri’s inhabitants are haunted by a more immediate fear. Most of the 300,000 people displaced in the violence are Kikuyus. Even as nervous Luos cluster for protection in local police stations, hundreds of Kikuyus are returning, demanding housing, work, and school places. “At the moment people are telling those displaced to stick where they are, because there is great land scarcity here,” says Muthui Mwai, a Nyeri journalist. “No one wants them back.”

Land scarcity is the leitmotif of the Kikuyu, the historic source of their anguish and the motivating force behind their success story. Accounting for around 22 percent of Kenya’s population of 38 million, the Kikuyu’s mark on the East African nation has been far greater than the figures imply, thanks to that driving hunger.

Under Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, another kinsman, they streamed out of Central Province, settling in the Rift Valley and on the coast. Today, they dominate the economy. Kikuyus drive most of Kenya’s matatus and its taxis, run its newspapers, and constitute much of its civil service, their entrepreneurial reach extending from the glitziest of hotels to the remotest roadside duka (kiosk). They also, joke Kikuyus, account for the biggest share of the country’s criminals and prison inmates.

kenyatta

Mzee Jomo Kenyatta & Golda Meir

The Kikuyu story, legend has it, begins on a ridge north of the town of Muranga, south of Nyeri, amid the misty valleys carved by Mount Kenya’s melting snows. To the precolonial Kikuyu, Mount Kenya, known as Kirinyaga, was the seat of God, or Ngai. Ngai created Gikuyu—the first man—then pointed earthward. “Build your homestead where the fig trees grow,” he said. Later, he sent Mumbi to join him, and the couple established the 10 clans that constitute “the house of Mumbi,” as the Kikuyu are also known.

You can actually visit this Kikuyu version of the Garden of Eden. Behind a sky-blue gate, painted with the words Mukurwe Wa Nyagathanga—the Tree of Gathanga—lie two mud huts, one for Gikuyu and one for Mumbi. The site looks toward Kirinyaga, but the mountain, famously elusive, is usually shrouded in cloud.

The compound may be an officially designated historical monument, but it looks semineglected. The skeleton of a half-built hotel, abandoned when a shady contractor disappeared with the funds—”This, too, is part of our culture,” jokes a villager—drips water nearby. In my many trips there, I’ve never stumbled on another visitor. “It’s not our way to look backward, only forward,” explains my Kikuyu driver.

The farming community that fanned out from this site had a special affinity with the soil. “There is a great desire in the heart of every Gikuyu man to own a piece of land on which he can build his home,” Kenyatta wrote in Facing Mount Kenya. “A man or a woman who cannot say to his friends, come and eat, drink and enjoy the fruit of my labour, is not considered as a worthy member of the tribe.”

It was this affinity that brought the Kikuyu into conflict with the British Empire. Initially, Britain’s 19th-century explorers showed little interest in the area that would be designated “Kenya,” training their eyes instead on the Buganda kingdom across Lake Victoria. Central Province’s fertile valleys were simply the place to stock their caravans with fresh food before the long trip west.

But with time, Kenya itself became the draw. Most of the land that British settlers appropriated belonged to the nomadic Masai, not the Kikuyu, but it was the Kikuyu who led an armed insurrection, Mau Mau, in the 1950s. With their fast-growing population, the Kikuyu needed room to expand. The British had removed that possibility by farming the White Highlands. British Capt. Richard Meinertzhagen claimed to have seen what was coming. “They are the most intelligent of the African tribes that I have met; therefore they will be the most progressive under European guidance and will be the most susceptible to subversive activities,” he wrote.

Mau Mau has left its scars, psychological if not physical. At least 150,000 Kikuyus passed through British detention camps, and more than 20,000 Mau Mau fighters died in combat. Central Province’s residents can still point out the caves where the freedom fighters hid and sketch the location of the British prisons and scaffolds where they were executed—in Nyeri’s case, on what is now the golf club’s parking lot.

Seeking scapegoats in that turbulent past, many older inhabitants insist today’s troubles are the work of a British government that has never forgiven the Kikuyu their revolt. Now the Brits are supposedly the hidden hand behind Luo leader Raila Odinga’s opposition campaign. “This is not a war between Kenyans, it’s a war imported from abroad,” fumes Joseph Karimi, co-author of The Kenyatta Succession. “The British were not satisfied with the rule of the Kikuyu, so they brought in this war. They never actually left Kenya and they never intend to.”

If the British won the fight against Mau Mau, the Kikuyu won the peace. When Britain pulled out in 1963, it was Kenyatta, once jailed as a Mau Mau leader, who became president, his community that took pole position. Forced proximity with the colonial administration and the proliferation of missionary schools in Central Province meant the Kikuyu were better educated than other Kenyans and best placed to benefit from independence. What’s more, they enjoyed the president’s patronage. “My people have the milk in the morning, your tribes the milk in the afternoon,” Kenyatta told non-Kikuyu ministers who complained.

The Kikuyu, outsiders feel, have been rubbing other communities’ noses in their pre-eminence ever since. “We’re obnoxious, we’re thrusting, we’re loud, and we’re everywhere,” acknowledges a Kikuyu banker friend. “Our problem is there aren’t enough of us to dominate, yet we’re too large to ignore. We are at once both obnoxious and indispensable.”

Although Kenyatta’s successor, Daniel arap Moi, systematically crushed Kikuyu aspirations while promoting his own Kalenjin, the community still thrived economically. Hence the conviction, voiced by snarl-toothed elders and fresh-faced undergraduates alike in Central Province, that only the Kikuyu—the community that stood up and defied the white invader—deserve to run the country.

I hear the familiar refrain in a hotel bar in Muranga, whose wall, significantly, is decorated with framed photographs of Kenyatta and Kibaki, but not of Moi. “If you did an experiment and took five Luos, five Luhyas, five Kambas, and five Kikuyus and gave them money to invest, you would see the result,” boasts John Kiriamiti, who publishes a Muranga newspaper. “The Kikuyu would be far, far ahead.” His business partner, Njoroge Gicheha, chimes in. “You cannot compare a fisherman in Nyanza who simply pulls a fish from the lake to a farmer who plants beans in Central Province and waits six months to harvest. The fact is, we work harder than other Kenyans.”

It’s this bumptious sense of entitlement that infuriates Kenya’s 47 other tribes. But, with the exception of two bouts of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, irritation was largely held in check under Moi, a topic of good-natured banter rather than abuse.

That changed with the 2002 elections that first put Kibaki in power. A consensus candidate backed by a broad tribal coalition, he swiftly reneged on promises of a new constitution devolving power to the regions. The pledge of a prime minister’s post for Odinga, the man who probably lost December’s elections, was withdrawn. As the tribal coalition disintegrated, Kenyans noticed that key ministries were all held by members of what they dubbed “the Mount Kenya Mafia.” Far from challenging Kenyatta’s system of ethnic favoritism, Kibaki reinforced it.

While Western donors relished Kibaki’s 6 percent to 7 percent growth rates, the mood on the ground was grim. The fact that Central Province’s milk, tea, and coffee industries surged ahead while other regions remained marginalized did not go unnoticed.

kibakiBoth sides helped whip low-level ethnic resentment into today’s frenzied hatred.

Odinga raised the stakes by preaching majimboism. Majimboism means federalism, a system many might think well-suited to over-centralized Kenya. But to Odinga’s supporters, it was a code word for something very specific: Kikuyus with plots or businesses in non-Kikuyu areas would be forced out and sent “home.”

In Central Province, Kikuyu MPs seized on the majimboist threat to foster a siege mentality. Rumors of a project to slaughter 1 million Kikuyus circulated like wildfire. “The amount of fear-mongering [texts] and e-mails was stupendous,” says Kwamchetsi Makokha, a columnist for the Nation newspaper. “It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. If you set the stage where a single community has isolated itself, what follows is a feeling of resentment by others, of ‘what’s so special about you?’ “

There was nothing random about the violence that exploded with the announcement of a Kibaki win. Deciding that the Kikuyu intended to rule Kenya indefinitely, Luos in the Western town of Kisumu looted Kikuyu shops, while Kalenjin militias drove Kikuyus from Rift Valley farms, settling scores dating back to Kenyatta’s 1970s settlement scheme.

A feared Kikuyu militia, the Mungiki, is now extracting revenge. But as mungiki demand ID cards at roadblocks and members of the “wrong” tribe watch homes go up in smoke, majimboism is being put into crude practice on the ground, decades of Kikuyu expansionism challenged and reversed

Many analysts see the entrepreneurship that defines the Kikuyu experience as the only hope for peace. Holding such a huge stake in the Kenyan economy, the Kikuyu have more to lose from the spiraling anarchy than any other group.

Here in Central Province, a region locked in belligerent memories of its insurgent past, there is little talk of compromise and no criticism of Kibaki. Growing ever further into a kikuyu nationalism, James Wanyaga, Nyeri’s former mayor, told me. “We can forget about the Luos and put our security machinery into Rift Valley, just as your people did under colonialism. And we would get on very well.” The price of Kikuyu hegemony has already proved greater than anyone wants to pay.

March 2, 2007

The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism

mt-kenya-flagOn a visit early this year to Africa , President Bush deplored the genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s, defended his refusal to send U.S. troops to Darfur and decried the ethnic slaughter in Kenya.Following a contested election, the Kikuyu, the dominant tribe in Kenya, have been subjected to merciless assault. People are separating from one another and butchering one another along lines of blood and soil.According to a compelling lead article in the new Foreign Affairs, “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” we may be witnessing in the Third World a re-enactment of the ethnic wars that tore Europe to pieces in the 20th century.”Ethnonationalism,” writes history professor Jerry Z. Muller of Catholic University, “has played a more profound role in modern history than is commonly understood, and the processes that led to the dominance of the ethnonational state and the separation of ethnic groups in Europe are likely to recur elsewhere.”

Western Man has mis-taught himself his own history.

“A familiar and influential narrative of 20th-century European history argues that nationalism twice led to war, in 1914 and then again in 1939. Thereafter, the story goes, Europeans concluded that nationalism was a danger and gradually abandoned it. In the postwar decades, Western Europeans enmeshed themselves in a web of transnational institutions, culminating in the European Union.”Muller contends that this is a myth, that peace came to the Old Continent only after the triumph of ethnonationalism, after the peoples of Europe had sorted themselves out and each achieved its own home.

At the beginning of the 20th century, there were three multi-ethnic empires in Europe: the Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian. The ethnonationalist Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 tore at the first.World War I was ignited by Serbs seeking to rip Bosnia away from Austria-Hungary. After four years of slaughter, the Serbs succeeded, and ethnonationalism triumphed in Europe.Out of the dead Ottoman Empire came the ethnonationalist state of Turkey and an ethnic transfer of populations between Ankara and Athens. Armenians were massacred and expelled from Turkey.

Out of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires came Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In the latter three nations, however, a majority ethnic group ruled minorities that wished either their own national home, or to join lost kinsmen.

In Poland, there were Ukrainians, Germans, Lithuanians and Jews. In Czechoslovkia, half the population was German, Slovak, Hungarian, Polish, Ruthenian or Jewish. In Yugoslavia were Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Albanians.The Second World War came out of Hitler’s attempt to unite all Germans in one ethnonational home—thus the Anschluss with Austria, the demand for return of the Sudeten Deutsch, and the pressure on Poland to return the Germans’ lost city of Danzig, and for Lithuania to give back German Memel and the Memelland it seized in 1923.World War II advanced the process in the most horrible of ways.The Jews of Europe, with no national home, perished, or fled to create one, in Israel.The Germans of the Baltic states, Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans and their own eastern provinces, almost to Berlin, were expelled in the most brutal act of ethnic cleansing in history—13 million to 15 million Germans, of whom 2 million perished in the exodus.At the end of World War II, Europe’s nations were more ethnically homogenous than they had ever been, at a horrendous cost in blood.
After 45 years of Cold War, the remaining multi-ethnic states—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—broke up into more than two dozen nation-states, all rooted in ethnonationlism.As Muller argues, ethnonationalism may be a precondition of liberal democracy. Only after all the tribes of Europe had their own ethnically homogenous nation-states did peace and comity come. And what happened in Europe in the 20th century may be a precursor of what is to come in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

In China, Uighurs, Mongolians and Tibetans all resist assimilation. Tatarstan may be the next problem for Russia. In the Balkans, it is Kosovo. Serbs there and in Bosnia may emulate the Albanians and secede.Many, writes Muller, “find ethnonationalism discomfiting both intellectually and morally. Social scientists go to great lengths to demonstrate that this is a product not of nature but of culture. …”But none of this will make ethnonationalism go away.”Indeed, we see it bubbling up from the Basque country of Spain, to Belgium, Bolivia, Baghdad and Beirut. Perhaps the wisest counsel for Kenya may be to get out of the way of this elemental force. Rather than seek to halt the inexorable, we should seek to accommodate it and ameliorate its sometimes awful consequences.