Posts tagged ‘nairobi’

July 7, 2009

Regional Governments & Self Rule

Mt Kenya

Central Regions

Rarely has a topic turned out to be so emotive, divisive and controversial like the majimbo debate.A debate that should otherwise be very intellectually stimulating has been reduced to a weapon for political one-upmanship and for settling ethnic scores.Far too many people feel that majimbo is a red-herring for ethnic dichotomisation. Their fears are greatly justified by the ethnic pogroms that have always, unfailingly, followed calls for majimboism.This ugly history notwithstanding, the real majimbo should stand up. Maybe all of us, pro-majimboists, and anti-majimboists need to pause for a moment.Let me confess here. I have been a rabid majimbo-phobic. Today, I am a real convertee to the gospel of majimboism. It is much easier to work on the real fears of the phobics, as well on the mischievous designs of the centrics, than to throw away the baby with bath water.

For beneath the acrimony, majimbo is good for us, a ‘‘nice-to-have’’ and not a ‘‘must-have’’ for the sake of our country.I have many reasons for my stand, but two will suffice. Take the case of our government structures at the grassroots. It is simply a tower of Babel.You have a district agricultural officer who reports to Kilimo House, trying to work through a district commissioner who reports to Harambee House. If they are to have a project that requires irrigation, the water officer has to seek the authority-to-incur-expenditure (AIE) from Maji House

I haven’t even talked about the Public Works, Environment and Youth officers involved – just in case the project has a Kazi-Kwa-Vijana component.The local MP has no inkling about the civil servants who serve in his constituency, let alone being responsible for their performance. In case of new districts, all these departments have to build their offices independently.So pathetic and scattered  are the offices that in some districts, they are referred to as the “government slums”. I look forward to the day the jimbo governor moves in to restore order.

I look forward also to see the demystification of Nairobi. In South Africa, Parliament sits in Cape Town, the Executive in Pretoria, the Judiciary in Bloemfontein while the main business address is Johannesburg.By the same measure, I look forward to having tea at Parliament Buildings in Eldoret, and go for a case mention in the Judiciary headquarters in Kisumu. I can only imagine the glee with which sukuma wiki vendors will welcome the announcement that the office of the Prime Minister has been moved to Thika.

The second reason is sad, unfortunately. All over the country, illegal gangs are coming up by the day. They may be different in terms of modus operandi or region. However, a striking similarity among them is the way they rush in to duplicate (or is it substitute?) functions that are the preserve of the central government.From illegal taxes to providing ‘‘security’’, these gangs point out to the need for us to re-examine the centralised system of governance.The distance between the central government and the people has grown to the maximum limit. When Jomo Kenyatta became President, Kenya’s population was 9 million. Today we are 36 million, yet the same miserable central government structures still prevail. They are writhing in pain, over-burdened by this insurmountable yoke of responsibility.We have the option of continuing to hide our heads in the sand like the ostrich or to move with the times.

by Moses Kuria ( secretary-general, Centre for Strategic and International Studies)

May 30, 2009

Protected: Madaraka Day 2009 Special

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February 25, 2009

Mugikuyu

I came into the world a Mũgĩkũyũ, and although I did not live my life entirely as a Mũgĩkũyũ,I think it is fitting that I should leave as a Mũgĩkũyũ.I don’t want to turn my back on a great and noble heritage.God created Kikuyus ,The British made Kenyans .I will die, what God created me a Mũgĩkũyũ

 

November 26, 2008

Kenya: A Nation On The Rocks 2009

“Nothing in all the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity”.

Martin Luther King, Jr. (January 15, 1929 – April 4, 1968)

Failed state Index

The index’s ranks are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability – four social, two economic and six political.The indicators are not designed to forecast when states may experience violence or collapse. Instead, they are meant to measure a state’s vulnerability to collapse or conflict.

Prime Minister Raila Odinga

Social Indicators

1. Demographic pressures: including the pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources. The pressure from a population’s settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards.

2. Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples: forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.

3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance: based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries. Including atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression. Institutionalized political exclusion. Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of “hate” radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

4. Chronic and sustained human flight: both the “brain drain” of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents and voluntary emigration of “the middle class.” Growth of exile/expat communities are also used as part of this indicator.

Economic Indicators

5. Uneven economic development along group lines: determined by group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status. Also measured by group-based poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels.

6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline: measured by a progressive economic decline of the society as a whole (using: per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures.) A sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments. Collapse or devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.

Political Indicators

7. Criminalization and/or delegitimisation of the state: endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency, accountability and political representation. Includes any widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.

8. Progressive deterioration of public services: a disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation. Also using the state apparatus for agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.

9. Widespread violation of human rights: an emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians. A rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices. Any widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution.)

10. Security apparatus as ‘state within a state’: an emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. An “army within an army” that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces.

11. Rise of factionalised elites: a fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines. Any use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith.”)

12. Intervention of other states or external factors: military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Kenya: guilty on all  twelve counts

July 17, 2008

Kenyan Cabinet

A power-sharing agreement here that brought peace in the wake of controversial elections in December that sparked political violence that killed at least 1,500 people, has been hailed as a model by the African Union for countries like Zimbabwe struggling to deal with the aftermath of a disputed vote. In February, President Mwai Kibaki named opposition leader Raila Odinga to the newly created post of prime minister. Kibaki and Odinga – the latter had accused the incumbent president of rigging the election – then agreed to parcel out top government posts among their allies and expand the Cabinet from 34 ministries to 41 to better represent Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups.At the time, it seemed diplomacy had worked, damping a blazing political rivalry with a handshake and a smile.

Violence soon ended. But five months later, many analysts say little has been done to remedy the conditions of impunity and corruption at the heart of Kenya’s political crisis. Among the country’s new ministers are men accused of inciting election violence and being key players in corruption scandals that have swindled taxpayers of more than $1 billion since the 1990s, according to Kroll Inc., an international risk-assessment firm. And a look at this year’s national budget suggests that the new parliament has returned to business as usual, these same analysts say.

“The script remains the same,” said Barach Muluka, a political commentator in the capital, Nairobi. “The cast is largely the same. A few players have come on board but everything is largely the same.”Not far from the site in the small village of Kiambaa where Kalenjin tribal fighters set a church alight, burning more than 30 Kikuyus alive in January, Kalenjin elders pointed to the man who they say could have stopped the violence.

“If William Ruto says stop, it will stop,” the elders told Human Rights Watch. Ruto, who denies involvement in ethnic violence, is the new minister of agriculture.In February, police investigated William ole Ntimama, the new minister of national heritage, after finding gasoline canisters in his vehicle in the town of Narok. Members of his Masai ethnic group had killed and raped Kikuyu residents, before burning their homes to the ground. Ntimama denies the allegations. “This is a warlord Cabinet,” said Muluka. “The citizens, the voters, are gun fodder. Once the warlords get what they want, the guns fall silent.”

To be sure, there are signs that Kenya is returning to normal. In the lakeside town of Naivasha, safari vehicles are filled with foreign tourists gawking at hippos and drinking tea at lakeside estates that were once the stomping grounds of Kenya’s colonial class. Across the road, sagging white tents, and trampled savannah grass are reminders of a displacement camp for thousands of refugees who had fled election violence. Chairs still cluster around a tin-roof building where the Kenya Red Cross handed out food and medicines. Today, only a few hundred people remain, fearful of going home and still waiting for the $158 government stipend for resettlement. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights estimates that there are 190,000 displaced people still living in camps across Kenya.

But there are signs that Kenya is heading for another political calamity.

Kenya has requested $1.1 billion from international donors to avert a looming food crisis caused by rising prices, and just 15 percent of the national budget has been allocated for development programs, according to the Mars Group, a Kenyan anti-corruption watchdog organization. Moreover, the newly created Cabinet positions will cost at least $800 million in office space, staff, bodyguards and state-issued luxury cars, more than a tenth of the national budget. Another $30 million, nearly the amount of the entire education budget, has been set aside for water and power utilities at the presidential estate. And more than $100 million has been allocated for debt payments on so-called ghost projects, including $70 million for a naval ship that has never been delivered and $100 million for a nonexistent fertilizer company, according to the Mars Group.

Why? Parliament has yet to debate the budget. Instead, lawmakers have spent much of their time fighting a plan to tax their annual salaries of $160,000. In contrast, a U.S. senator earns $169,300. “If they dillydally, and invoke political dishonesty as we have seen in the past – take advantage of power to reintroduce tribalism, corruption, and benefit a nucleus of friends – then there is a likelihood that this will not be a lasting peace,” said Omar Hassan, a commissioner with the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. “The portrayal that Kenya was a unified, dignified, peaceful country, that same myth will be challenged and deconstructed a second time.”

Cabinet ministers under a cloud

Kenya’s new coalition government includes seven new ministries. Several Cabinet ministers, however, are believed to be behind past corruption scandals and post-election violence. They include:– William Ruto, minister of agriculture: Kenya’s National Commission on Human Rights accuses him of threatening Kikuyu farmers who had settled on Kalenjin lands. Both militiamen and refugees displaced by the conflict say he incited violence. Ruto denies the allegations.– William ole Ntimama, minister of national heritage: A Masai leader, he has been accused of inciting violence against Kikuyu farmers in the Rift Valley. He denies the allegations.– Amos Kimunya, minister of finance: Just this month, he announced his resignation after parliament gave him a vote of no-confidence. Kimunya is believed to have participated in the secret sale of a government-owned luxury hotel to a Libyan investment group for less than half its value.– John Michuki, acting minister of finance: As the former minister for internal security, Michuki ordered raids on a Nairobi newspaper that had written extensively about government corruption and the presidents family affairs.

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